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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Overview
Remote attackers are always trying to find vulnerabilities of their intended

target(s). Towards this goal, the attackers use different ways to compromise remote
systems. Knowing Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of targets is the main requirement
for address-based remote attacks. The address-based remote attacks include two main
categories, (1) address-based Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) and (2) remote
exploits.
Address-based DDoS attack uses multiple compromised systems to target a
single victim computer. However, for remote exploits, one computer can be used by an
attacker to gain unauthorized access to a vulnerable victim. To start remote exploit
attacks, vulnerabilities should be found on the victims. For example, an attacker
can use remote code execution vulnerability to execute malicious codes and obtain a
remote access to a victim. The attacker can also use privilege escalation vulnerability
to gain more privileges on the victim. In this case, the victim is compromised and
may also be used for attacking other computers.

1

To prevent these attacks we need to know the attack process and each step
taken by attackers. Once we understand the steps of a successful attack, then we
may be able to detect or mitigate the attack. Intrusion Kill Chain [2] is a systematic
process that outlines these steps. This end-to-end process is described as a chain
because failure of each step will break entire process. The steps of the intrusion kill
chain is defined as (1) reconnaissance, (2) weaponization, (3) delivery, (4) exploitation,
(5) installation, (6) command and control, and (7) actions on objectives. The best
advice for defenders is moving their detection and prevention measures up the kill
chain to reduce the cost and damage caused by any attack.
During the first step of an attack (reconnaissance), an attacker needs to gather
information about its target. The first required information is the target’s IP address.
When the attacker finds the IP address of the target, the attacker will be able to scan
the target’s open ports and services. For example, a target with an enabled remote
access service such as Secure Shell (SSH) could be a good choice for the attacker. In
this case, the attacker can send one connection request to the target to receive the
SSH server string. This string reveals which SSH implementation (version number) is
used on the target. If the version of the SSH implementation is not up-to-date, then
the attacker does not need to write any piece of code. In fact, some exploit codes
could be found based on the service and its old version number. Using one of those
exploit codes makes the attacker able to obtain remote access to the target.
There are several countermeasures to protect systems from the attacks discussed above. These countermeasures include firewalls and Intrusion Prevention and
Detection Systems (IPDS). Regardless of the strength of these countermeasures used
2

in practice, preventing attackers from gathering information about targets (attack
surfaces [3]) could be the best way to combat remote attacks. The use of static IP
addresses leaves the target vulnerable because they are discoverable. Furthermore,
the attacker has enough time to discover a penetration way in order to gain access
to the target. Dynamic IP addressing (IP hopping), on the other hand, can change
the target’s IP address randomly and dynamically. More specifically, it can limit the
amount of time that the attacker has to find the target. In fact, the attacker has
to constantly try to find the target’s IP address. This type of defense mechanism is
called the Moving Target Defense (MTD). The goals of IP hopping MTD are:
• Deter: Ability to increase attackers’ level of effort needed to achieve their goals.
Deterrence is the most effective way to secure a system from cyber attacks.
It increases the cost of malicious activity because of increase in the resources
required by attackers. This goal can be achieved by IP hopping because of using
random IP addresses.
• Deception: Ability to increase uncertainty and apparent complexity for attackers. IP hopping can deceive attackers by dynamically changing the IP address
of the target.
In order for this strategy to work, the following challenges have to be overcome:
• Selecting the next random IP address of the system should be highly unpredictable.
• Changing the IP address should be done in a short interval.
3

• Changing the IP address should not cause any unavailability of the system for
legitimate peers.
• Implementation of this method should not need any change in the network
equipment.
Motivated by the aforementioned challenges, this dissertation proposes a Moving Target Mobile IPv6 Defense (MTM6D) in which Mobile IPv6 is utilized, where
there is a permanent IP address—Home Address (HoA)—which is used to avoid disrupting TCP sessions and a temporary IP address—Care-of Address (CoA)—which
is used to connect to other nodes. MTM6D dynamically changes the CoA of a host
for moving the target. To better understand the need for the proposed method, a
question needs to be answered why we need an MTD method when we have other
defensive measures like IPsec.
The answer is that IPsec with an Internet Key Exchange method, like IKEv2,
is a computer program that like others could be threatened by zero day vulnerabilities.
For example, a UDP port needs to be open to start IPsec/IKE. This open port can
be targeted by DoS attacks or buffer overflow vulnerabilities. Therefore, one effective
way is preventing a system from being targeted for attacks. We should prevent attacks
at the reconnaissance step instead of letting attackers to find the system and its open
ports to start testing different ways for penetration. More clearly, the proposed idea is
moving around (in the huge address space of IPv6) as fast as possible instead of staying
in the same place to be targeted by attackers. Note that we use IPsec/IKEv2 in the
proposed method as a Defense in Depth and to remove accessibility of permanent

4

Figure 1.1: Avionic systems as an example of remote control through the Internet.

IP addresses in order to improve privacy and anonymity. However, attackers need
to find the dynamic IP addresses of our systems in the first step, a task which is
not easy to accomplish. For example, with less than half a second round trip time
between two hosts, we can dynamically change their IP addresses in an unpredictable
way each two seconds. This way, attackers need to find the current IP addresses
between about 18 quintillion choices (if we use 64 bits of IPv6 address size for the
interface identifier) during less than two seconds. This is nearly impossible with the
available equipment like trying to find a tiny needle in a giant haystack in a very short
time. Therefore, even an unpatched implementation of IPsec/IKE with well-known
vulnerabilities cannot be easily targeted in the proposed method.
MTM6D can be used as a remote attack protection method. More specifically,
MTM6D can improve the security of Critical Infrastructure Networks, Virtual Private
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Networks, and Internet-Controlled Systems. The system shown in Figure 1.1 plays a
critical role in being able to move towards the next generation flight control systems
that prevent tragic events such as the 9/11 attack, the Malaysia Airlines flight 370
crash, or the Germanwings flight 9525 crash. These flight control systems are based
on uninterruptible autopilot system that can be used in emergency events like terrorist attempts to hijack an aircraft. Besides the pilot(s) and onboard sensors, this
system can be activated by authorized government agencies through satellite communications. MTM6D can protect these systems against remote attacks by providing
both aircraft and the ground station with dynamic IP addresses.
MTM6D can also be used as an anticensorship method. Although the Internet has become a hub around which every aspect of our lives—from commerce to
leisurely activities—is centered, many people around the world are not able to freely
access information over the Internet. In this research, regardless of the socio-political
viewpoints, we focus on the design of anticensorship technology that can be implemented on the side of information purveyors. The primary objective is to develop a
framework for combating censorship, which makes it too expensive and impractical
for the adversary to censor targeted web sites. In Figure 1.2, we illustrate the basic
scheme. On the server-side, n different CoAs are utilized with three IPs (IP1 , IP2
and IPn ). Each CoA is assigned to a randomly chosen group of users. After shuffling,
the users will be re-grouped and will be connected via newly generated CoAs. The
efficacy of the basic scheme depends on the number of CoAs utilized and the number
of agents of the adversary pretending to be normal users. These agents will seek out
the CoAs in order to block them. By changing the CoAs and shuffling the users, we
6

Figure 1.2: For illustration purposes, n different randomly chosen CoAs are assigned
to different groups of users; three user groups assigned to IP1 , IP2 , and IPn are
highlighted.

provide a moving target. By utilizing a novel, cost-based shuffling method, we make
it cost-inhibitive for the adversary to try to outnumber the system.

1.2

Background
In this section we introduce stateless address autoconfiguration, Mobile IPv6,

route optimization, return routability procedure, binding management, multiple careof addresses, and communication by IPsec. These concepts are essential for understanding the rest of the chapter.

1.2.1

Stateless Address Autoconfiguration
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [4] is a way to automatically

assign IP addresses to hosts. Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) [5] is
another way for easier configuration of IPv6 addresses. SLAAC helps hosts to automatically generate global IPv6 addresses without needing any help of DHCP servers.
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For this purpose, hosts should use Router Discovery message of Neighbor Discovery
protocol [6] via the Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) [7].
With SLAAC, routers periodically send Route Advertisements (RAs) via ICMPv6.
Each RA message includes information about its subnet like its router’s prefix (the
first 64 bits of the IPv6 address). If a host is configured to use SLAAC to obtain
its IPv6 address, the host listens for the RA message and takes the advertised prefix
to generate a unique IPv6 address. For this strategy to work, SLAAC dynamically
generates a host identifier that is 64 bits (based on the host’s MAC address by default) and combines it with the advertised prefix (64 bits) to create a 128 bits IPv6
address (tentative address). This generated address should be checked against current
occupancy. For this goal, a Neighbor Solicitation message is sent with the tentative
address as the destination address. If someone has the same address, it will send back
a Neighbor Advertisement message. In this case, the host cannot use this tentative
address and should generate another address to finally find an unoccupied IPv6 address. After that, the final address will be used as the global IPv6 address of the
host.
SLAAC mechanism makes a host able to dynamically change its IPv6 address.
Because of this valuable mechanism, IPv6 has been used as the base of new generations
of IP hopping methods.

1.2.2

Mobile IPv6
To provide IP devices with mobility function, Mobile IPv6 was standardized in

2004 [8]. The latest revision of Mobile IPv6 was published as RFC 6275 in 2011 [9]. A
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host which supports the Mobile IPv6 protocol can move from one subnet to another.
It means, the host can change its point of attachment to the Internet. The IP address
of each host is assigned based on the prefix address of its current subnet. Therefore,
when the Mobile Node (MN) moves from one subnet to another, its previous IPv6
address becomes invalid in the new subnet. To solve this problem, Mobile IPv6 uses
a second IP address.
Handling the changing IP address of an MN is one of the most important
features of Mobile IPv6. For this goal, an MN in Mobile IPv6 has two types of IPv6
addresses:
• Permanent IP address: Home Address (HoA) is assigned to the MN when it
is attached to its Home Agent (HA). HA is a router in the home network that
acts like a proxy for the MN.
• Current IP address: Care-of Address (CoA) is assigned to the MN when it
moves to a foreign network.
At the beginning, the MN is attached to its HA and registers its HoA on the
HA. When the MN moved to a foreign network, it registers a CoA based on the
prefix address of that network. Then, the MN updates its HA with its new CoA. For
this goal, the MN sends a message called Binding Update (BU) to the HA. The BU
message includes both CoA and HoA (binding information) of the MN.
When the HA receives the BU message and accepts it, the HA sends a Binding
Acknowledgement (BA) message to confirm that the BU message is accepted. Then,
a bidirectional tunnel is created between the IP address of the HA and the MN’s
9

Figure 1.3: Mobile IPv6 bidirectional tunnel.

CoA. After this step, all packets with the MN’s HoA on their destination address
are intercepted by the HA and tunneled to the MN. The tunnel is also used to send
packets originated at the MN to Correspondent Nodes (CNs). This process is shown
in Figure 1.3.
Communication path between the MN and its CN via the tunnel may be longer
than direct path between them. For example, if the MN moves to the CN’s subnet,
they should still use the HA for packet exchanging. This situation called triangular
routing that was one of the major problems of Mobile IPv4 [10]. Route optimization
mechanism is the solution used by Mobile IPv6 for direct communication between the
MN and a CN.
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1.2.3

Route Optimization
Route optimization mechanism is a part of Mobile IPv6 standard. This mech-

anism is used to forward packets between an MN and its peer node (CN) via a direct
path without detouring through the MN’s HA. In order for this strategy to work, both
the MN and the CN should support the route optimization mechanism according to
the specification of Mobile IPv6.
To optimize the route, the CN should hold the current CoA of the MN. When
the MN moves to a new subnet, the MN should send a BU message to the CN. This BU
message includes the latest CoA of the MN. After the successful route optimization
mechanism, the MN and the CN will have a direct communication path as illustrated
in Figure 1.4. In fact, the source IP address of each packet’s header originated at the
MN is the MN’s CoA. The same CoA is also used as the destination IP address of
each packet’s header originated at the CN. Therefore, different IP addresses (CoAs)
are used in packets’ header depending on the current position of the MN. However,
changing IP addresses of peer nodes causes communication disruptions in the upper
layers (e.g., TCP sessions). To make it transparent to the upper layer, the permanent
IP address (HoA) of the MN should be used in the upper layer. Therefore, the HoA
needs to be swapped with the CoA in the source. The HoA is also needed to be stored
in packets’ header and swapped with the CoA in the destination. For this purpose,
Mobile IPv6 defines a new extension header called Routing Header Type 2 (RH2) and
a new option called Home Address Option (HAO) as a part of Destination Option
Header of IPv6 [11].
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Figure 1.4: Optimized communication between an MN and a CN.

The routing header type 2 is used to carry an MN’s CoA in packets originated
at an HA or a CN to the MN. After the route optimization mechanism, the CN stores
the MN’s HoA in the routing header type 2 of each packet’s header and uses the MN’s
CoA as the destination IP address and forwards the packet. Therefore, the packet is
sent directly to the MN’s CoA. When the MN receives this packet, the MN swaps the
address stored in the routing header type 2 (HoA) with the destination IP address
of the packet (CoA). Then this packet is forwarded to the upper layers. In this way,
upper layer protocols of both the MN and the CN always see permanent IP addresses
of the peer nodes.
The destination options header is used to carry optional information that needs
to be processed only by destination nodes. The home address option, as a part of
the destination option header, stores the MN’s HoA in each packet’s header when
the packet is sent by the MN while away from the home network. In this case, the

12

MN’s CoA is stored in the source IP address of the packet. When the CN receives the
packet, the CN swaps the source IP address of the packet (CoA) with the HoA stored
in the home address option. Note that the CN checks its Binding Cache (explained
in Section 1.2.5) before swapping the addresses.

1.2.4

Return Routability Procedure
Protecting BU messages is very important in the route optimization mecha-

nism. If a CN accepts a BU message without any verification, an attacker is able to
redirect packets sent to the MN to the attacker. Therefore, a BU message should be
protected by return routability procedure [9]. This procedure creates a shared secret
between an MN and a CN. The procedure provides a method to prove to the CN that
the CoA and HoA included in the BU message are owned by the MN.
Before sending a BU message, the MN sends two messages that one of them
is sent with its HoA in the source address of the message called Home Test Init
message and another with its CoA called Care-of Test Init message. The CN receives
the first message through the MN’s HA and the second message through a direct
path. The CN replies to both messages with a Home Test message and Care-of Test
message, respectively. The Home Test and Care-of Test messages include token values
computed by the CN. When the MN receives these replay messages, the MN generates
a shared secret using the token values and puts it in the BU message. The CN can
verify the BU message based on the sent token values to make sure that the MN has
received both Home Test and Care-of Test messages. That means, the HoA and the
CoA of the BU message are assigned to the same MN.
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Each time that the MN changes its CoA, the same procedure is needed to
verify the right of the MN to use the HoA and the validity of its CoA. The return
routability procedure adds some overhead and delay to the route optimization mechanism because of adding four extra messages per each BU message.

1.2.5

Binding Management
Binding Update List (BUL) and Binding Cache [9] are two data structures used

for optimizing the route between an MN and a CN based on the route optimization
mechanism. Each MN has a BUL and each CN has a Binding Cache. The BUL stores
information per each BU message sent by the MN to its CNs. When the MN wants
to send a BU message to a destination that has already received the previous BU
message, the MN updates the related BUL entry with this new BU message. When
the MN changes its CoA, it automatically sends BU messages to all of its CNs found
in the BUL.
The MN checks the BUL before sending each data packet. If the destination
of the packet is found in the BUL, the packet should be sent using direct path by
inserting the CoA as the source address in the header of the packet and HoA in the
home address option. Each BUL entry includes some information like:
• The IP address of a CN to which a BU message was sent.
• The HoA for which the BU message was sent.
• The CoA that is sent in the BU message.
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The Binding Cache of a CN includes binding information of a MN received by
the CN. When the CN receives and verifies a BU message, the CN inserts an entry
in the Binding Cache or updates it. The entry includes some fields like:
• The HoA of the MN which is in the Binding Cache entry.
• The CoA of the MN obtained from the BU message.
When the CN has a data packet to send, the CN checks the Binding Cache
for the destination address of the packet. If the destination address of the packet is
found as the HoA of a MN, the CN puts the related CoA of the MN in the destination
address in the packet header and the HoA in the routing header type 2. The Binding
Cache is also checked when the CN received a packet with the home address option.
If the entry is found, then the CN swaps the source address and the HoA of the packet
header.

1.2.6

Multiple Care-of Addresses
The Binding Identification (BID) number extension of the Mobile Ipv6 stan-

dard can be used by a MN to utilize multiple CoAs over the same HoA with its
CNs [12]. In this way, the MN can register multiple IPv6 addresses as its CoAs. For
this purpose, the MN generates a unique BID per each CoA and stores these BIDs
in the BUL. The BIDs are used to handle each binding independently. BU messages
via the Binding Identifier mobility option are used to register the MN’s CoAs.
If the Multiple Care-of Addresses registration is disabled on the CNs, the CNs
cannot understand the BID mobility option included in the BU messages. Therefore,
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this unknown mobility option is ignored by the CNs. As the result, each CN will put
the new received CoA in the Binding Cache and use it to send packets to the MN.
This process helps the MN to have a unique CoA per each CN or per each group of
CNs.

1.2.7

Communication by IPsec
IP security (IPsec) is a set of mechanisms to protect IP communications. Sup-

porting IPsec was originally a mandatory requirement of IPv6 but RFC 6434 [13]
made it only a recommendation. The base architecture to implement and deploy
IPsec is described in [14]. IPsec provides the following security features for each IP
packet of a communication session:
• Authentication: Verifies that the received packet is actually from the claimed
sender.
• Integrity: Ensures that the packet’s content was not changed in transit.
• Confidentiality: Conceals the packet’s content through encryption.
Two main extension headers used by IPsec are:
• Authentication Header (AH): Provides data origin authentication and data integrity [15].
• Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP): Provides confidentiality, data origin authentication, and data integrity [16]. Using IPsec ESP is recommended in Mobile IPv6 [9].
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When a packet is ready to be sent by a MN, the packet has already supplied the
HoA as the source address in its header. If a BUL entry is found for the destination of
this packet, the MN extracts the CoA of the entry and inserts it in the home address
option of the packet. When the packet reaches IPsec, it will be encrypted and some
headers will be added. After that, the home address option (CoA) is swapped with
the source address (HoA) of the packet header.
When the CN receives this packet, the home address option and the source
address will be swapped. Then, the IPsec implementation receives the packet. Therefore, when the packet is processed by IPsec, the HoA is in the source address of the
packet. Because of this process, the HoA is used by IPsec as the selector to avoid
changing the security association per each updated CoA of the MN. These processes
are shown in Figure 1.5.
According to this standard Mobile IPv6 and IPsec implementations, the source
or the destination address header of a packet on the path is the MN’s CoA. Note that
the MN’s HoA is still in the packet header in the routing header type 2 or the home
address option as illustrated in Figure 1.6 and Figure 1.7.

1.3

Related Work
This section includes a brief review of some remote attack protection methods

based on MTD. Also, some of the limitations of these methods are discussed.
Some cloud-based MTD methods were presented in [17], [18], and [19] to
combat DDoS attacks against the Internet services. In these methods, selective server
replication and intelligent client reassignment are used on the victimized servers.
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Figure 1.5: Packet processing: (left) received packet processing flowchart (right)
sending packet processing flowchart.

These servers are turned into moving targets in order to isolate attacks. When a
server is under attack, the server instance is replaced with a new replica at another
network location. Then, the clients are migrated to this new replica of the server. In
order for this strategy to work, only migrated clients know the new location of the
server. When the clients’ migration is completed, the victimized server is recycled.
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Figure 1.6: Packet format with RH2 (CN to MN).

Figure 1.7: Packet format with HAO (MN to CN).

Another group of cloud-based MTD methods are based on Virtual Machine
Live Migrations (VM-LM). These methods focused on integrity of software before
migration [20] or considered the availability and duration of migration in practice [21].
Trusted dynAmic Logical hEterogeNeity sysTem (TALENT) [22] is a method
designed for critical infrastructure applications. It is a framework for migrating mission critical applications to a different platform at random time intervals when an
attack or new vulnerability is discovered. Based on the live-migration of the TALENT method, it will be possible to change the hardware and operation system on top
of which a sensitive application is running. In this method, the state of the application (execution state of the process and its open files and sockets) is preserved during
the migration. More specifically, TALENT creates a moving target by changing the
platform on-the-fly.
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A hierarchical attack representation model is presented in [23] to assess the
effectiveness of these cloud-based MTD methods. A formal security analysis with
various performance and security metrics was leveraged for this comparison.
The above-mentioned MTD methods do not aid prevention. More specifically,
these methods are reactive in nature. Furthermore, detecting flooding attacks could
be possible through the use of state of the art tools and techniques in network traffic
analysis like [24] and [25]. However, it is not easy to detect penetration attacks such as
remote exploits that take advantage of target vulnerabilities. Zero-day vulnerabilities,
previously unseen, are even more difficult to detect. Therefore, considering both
prevention and treatment measures in place is desirable to provide better security
overall.
OpenFlow Random Host Mutation (OF-RHM) is an MTD method introduced
in [26]. The goal of this method is changing IP addresses of end-hosts randomly,
frequently, and quickly using software-defined networking (SDN) approach. SDN
provides flexible infrastructure in order to develop and manage random IP addresses.
In this method, Real IP address (rIP) of each host remains unchanged but a new
virtual IP (vIP), selected from the unused network address space, is assigned to each
host at regular intervals. vIPs will be used as the only routable addresses and are
automatically translated into the rIPs and vice versa at the network edges close to
the source or destination host. Implementation of this method requires two major
components (1) gateways to perform rIP-vIP translation by OpenFlow switches and
(2) a central management authority by a centralized controller [27]. For scalability,
several controllers can be used that each should manage a segment of the network. Af20

ter initialization, no information needs to be exchanged among controllers; therefore,
each controller can act independently.
OpenFlow has some advantages such as being transparent to the end hosts
(does not need any change in the end hosts’ hardware or software) and not using any
type of encapsulation for data packets. On the other hand, drawbacks of this method
are requiring central authority management (NOX controller) and new equipment
(OpenFlow switches).

1.3.1

MT6D
Moving Target IPv6 Defense (MT6D) [28] is one the best prevention methods

that leverages the huge address space of IPv6. MT6D is designed to achieve two goals,
(1) protecting against targeted network attacks and (2) maintaining user privacy.
MT6D repeatedly changes the IP addresses of both peer hosts in mid-session without
dropping sessions. In order for this strategy to work, IPv6 is used because of the
ability to seamlessly bind new IP addresses via SLAAC.
Changing IP addresses can also prevent attackers to determine whether the
same two hosts are communicating. Furthermore, attackers need to reacquire their
targets after each rotation interval (Figure 1.8). Dynamically rotating the IP addresses of the peer hosts helps MT6D to prevent some attacks such as address-based
DoS (or DDoS) and Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks. These attacks can be
started by obtaining the IP addresses of their targets while MT6D can prevent them
by rotating the IP addresses. Hosts’ privacy is also preserved by MT6D because of
leveraging dynamic obscuration of the hosts’ IP addresses. The dynamic obscuration
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Figure 1.8: Attacker’s view of a communication between two hosts.

prevents attackers from identifying and tracking the hosts. It also prevents network
traffic correlation because of changing the IP addresses multiple times during a single
session.
In MT6D, dynamic Interface IDentifier (IID) obscuration is leveraged to generate dynamic IP addresses. MT6D IIDs are computed through the use of three
values:
• EUI-64 IID [29]: The IEEE-defined 64-bit Extended Unique Identifier (EUI-64)
is a static IID per each host across different subnets. It can be calculated based
on the Media Access Control (MAC) address of the host. Combination of these
64 bits with the subnet prefix (included in route advertisement messages of the
subnet’s router) performs a unique IPv6 unicast address for the host.
• Shared symmetric key: Two hosts should share a symmetric key before starting
the MT6D. Out-of-band key exchange is suggested for sharing the key.
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• Timestamp: Twice the single-trip time between the peer hosts is the minimum
value of the time interval. After each time interval the value of the current time
is used as the timestamp in order to calculate the next IID.
A hash value of these three values is calculated after each time interval. The
leftmost 64 bits of this hash value constructs a new IID. This new IID is used to
generate a new IPv6 address per each host. After generating and registering the new
IPv6 address, the previous one is removed by the host to prevent any connection
attempt from attackers.
Putting the EUI-64 IID of the peer host in the same formula generates the
IPv6 address of the peer host for the current time interval. In this way, each host can
generate a new IPv6 address for itself and calculate the IPv6 address of its peer host.
Instead of rewriting original data packets, MT6D encapsulates them to Unreliable Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets and uses virtual IP addresses (dynamic IPv6
addresses) in their header. Architecture of single MT6D host includes an encapsulator
and a decapsulator.
MT6D encapsulator is responsible for transmitting outbound packets. When
a new packet is ready to send to the peer host that supports MT6D, the encapsulator
encrypts the packet and encapsulates it in a UDP packet and inserts the dynamic IP
addresses in its header. Reverse process is done at the receiver by MT6D decapsulator.
The following two suggestions are provided in [28] for implementing MT6D:
• Embedded software: Implementing MT6D as embedded software onto the host
(host-based).
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• Gateway device: Implementing MT6D on a separate device (e.g., gateway).
In this option MT6D is transparent to the host useful to support hosts with
different platform. This implementation can be used as a gateway of a trusted
environment to connect two private networks.
MT6D, however, has some drawbacks and limitations:
• Packet loss exists due to address conflict. Address conflict may occur because of
selecting random IP addresses. Although the probability of an address conflict is
very small in the seemingly endless supply of IP addresses in IPv6, it can disrupt
the connection during the whole rotation interval that an address conflict occurs.
• Key management is lacking. Rekeying is needed in order to limit the amount
of encrypted data with the same shared key. Typically a separate key exchange
protocol is needed to prevent key recovery attacks. However, the MT6D method
lacks support for key exchange protocols.
• Relatively tight time synchronization is needed. Lack of an accurate time synchronization method may cause incorrect prediction of the peer’s current IP
address.
• Dynamic address rotation interval is not supported. If a suspicious activity
is detected by a host (e.g., being under attack), there is no way for the host
to change its IP address before the end of the current time interval. Therefore, a dynamic address rotation interval is desirable depending on the network
situations.
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1.4

Dissertation Motivation and Contribution
The motivation of this dissertation is to provide a new MTD method based on

Mobile IPv6. This MTD method will be used for improving the security of Critical
Infrastructure Networks, Virtual Private Networks, and Internet-Controlled Systems.
This method will also be used as an anticensorship method.
The primary contribution of this dissertation is the development of an MTD
method based on Mobile IPv6 (MTM6D) to dynamically change the IP address of a
server to make it difficult for an attacker to find the server. The second contribution is
the proposal of a hybrid scheme by utilizing the MTM6D approach along with some
intrusion detection schemes to establish a framework for supporting secure VPNs
(MVPN). The third contribution is the design of a lossless method for IP-based
control (MTM6D II) that can also prevent black hole attacks and bandwidth depletion
DDoS attacks. The last contribution is the development of an anticensorship method
to make it difficult or impractical for an adversary to deploy censorship techniques.

1.5

Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized in the following manner. To solve security risks

of static IP addresses of critical infrastructure servers, a Moving Target Mobile IPv6
Defense (MTM6D) [30] is proposed in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, a framework for
building secure Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) with a novel Mobile IPv6 based
moving target defense strategy (MVPN) is presented [31]. MTM6D II, a framework
for building a secure and private peer to peer communication [32] is discussed in
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Chapter 4. Later, in Chapter 5 an anti-censorship framework using moving target
defense designed with Mobile IPv6 is proposed [33, 34]. The simulation results for
scalability test are presented in Chapter 6. Finally, some conclusions are offered and
the future work is discussed in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2

SECURING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE BY MOVING TARGET
DEFENSE

One of the most important areas of information security is industrial system
security. Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure networks causing an outage quickly
escalate into the worst case scenario. Remote attackers can start an attack from all
around the world. During the reconnaissance step, attackers need to gather information about the victim. One of the most important information in this regard is
the IP address of the victim. Static IP addresses can help attackers in two aspects.
First, they are easily discoverable. Second, after accessing the victim, the attacker can
maintain this access for a long time. So, an effective defense is a mechanism to change
the IP addresses randomly and dynamically. By using Mobile IPv6 we can have both
a permanent IP address to avoid disrupting TCP sessions and a temporary IP address
to connect to other nodes. Therefore, we developed a Moving Target Mobile IPv6
Defense (MTM6D) to dynamically change the IP address of critical infrastructure
servers. The main goals of our method are using a combination of available standards
to defend the victim against targeted attacks and eliminating packet loss because of

27

address collision during address rotations. The feasibility and performance evaluation
of MTM6D are demonstrated by real network implementation.

2.1

Introduction
Attacks on critical infrastructure networks like power grid, natural gas, water

distribution, etc., can cause loss of life, threaten public safety/national security, or
impact environmental disasters. The U.S. Cyber Consequence Unit declared that a
single wave of cyber-attacks on U.S. critical infrastructures could exceed $700 billion
- equivalent to 50 major hurricanes hitting U.S. soil at once. Therefore, protecting
critical infrastructures from cyber-attacks is an important national issue. Especially,
it is a big challenge to protect the infrastructures from remote attacks that can be
started from unlimited distance to compromise the server of Industrial Control Systems (ICS). In this chapter we introduce a solution to defeat these remote attacks.
The solution can be utilized without any changes to the existing network infrastructure. The feasibility and performance evaluation of our method are demonstrated by
real network implementation in Section 2.3.
MTM6D uses standard methods. Having a permanent IP address (home address) to avoid disrupting TCP sessions and a temporary IP address (care-of address)
to connect to other nodes are mentioned in Mobile IPv6 [8]. Therefore, we select
Mobile IPv6 as the base of MTM6D. Our method dynamically changes the care-of
address for moving targets. Note that we do not need to have a real mobility in our
network.
Goals of MTM6D:
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• Defeat targeted attacks using dynamic IP addresses in the huge range of IPv6
addresses.
• Eliminate packet loss occurring from address collision. Each node must verify
that its new IP address is free (avoid address collision) so a mechanism is needed
to inform correspondent nodes of this verified new IP address (binding update
mechanism).
• Avoid adding new requirements like time synchronization.
• Add capability of having dynamic address rotation interval.
• Avoid sharing IP updates with a correspondent node known as an attacker.
• Avoid using permanently accessible home agents because permanent home addresses are only accessible through home agents.
We assume that attackers are not able to capture packets communicated between the server and clients. Although packet headers have the dynamic IP address
of the server, a static IP address is stored in the home address option of Mobile IPv6.
This is a disadvantage of our method proposed in this chapter in comparison with
MT6D that maintains user privacy. In Chapter 4 a proposed will be made to remove
the home address option to maintain privacy with the help of IPsec because the Security Parameter Index (SPI) of IPsec header is unique per each host that we are in
contact with.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Design and implementation
are introduced in Section 2.2, while Section 2.3 presents the performance evaluation
of our testing. Finally, conclusion and future work are described in Section 2.4.

2.2

Design and Implementation
In this method, we focus on a network with a server and a limited and pre-

defined number of clients. We want to prevent remote attacks against the critical
infrastructure servers by using dynamic IP addresses. Using a network layer moving
target defense, the server cannot be located for exploitation, and secure connectivity
is maintained with clients. We use Mobile IPv6 [8] as the base of MTM6D. Our server
acts like a mobile node of Mobile IPv6. We use the home address of the mobile node
as a permanent address of the server and the care-of address of the mobile node as
the dynamic address of the server. Only the care-of address of the server is accessible
by clients so we use a random IP address generator to dynamically rotate the care-of
address of the server.
Mobile IPv6 is selected in our method for these reasons:
• The large address space of IPv6 is used to ensure sufficient entropy in the
randomization.
• Server’s home address can be used as a permanent address to be transparent
to upper layers. Because we disconnect the home agent from the network, this
home address is not accessible through the network. The only accessible IP
address of the server, care-of address, is rotated randomly and dynamically.
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• Mobile IPv6 enables nodes to cache the binding of a permanent IP address
with its dynamic IP address and then send any packets destined for the server
directly to it using this dynamic IP address.
• Binding update mechanism can be used to inform clients of the server’s dynamic
IP address.
Note that using binding update mechanism has two advantages to improve the
security of the server:
1. Clients use the new server’s dynamic IP address only after receiving the BU
message from the server. So this new IP address has been registered by the
server. Note that generating random IP address may face address collision
so the server should send the BU message after making sure that the new IP
address is ready to use.
2. The server is able to decide who should be informed of the new IP address. If the
server detects an attack from one of the clients, the server can ignore updating
that client with its new IP address. So the attacker cannot have access to the
server after address-rotating of the server.
A proof of concept prototype implementation of MTM6D was developed to
prove the validity and evaluate the performance of the design. To implement our
method, we established a new IPv6 testbed whose network topology is shown in Figure 2.1. We have four routers (R1, R2, R3, and R4), one layer 3 switch (Switch1), and
five computers containing 2.4GHz Intel Core 2 Duo CPU with 4GB DDR2 800MHz
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Figure 2.1: The network topology of the testbed.

RAM. Ubuntu 14.04 is installed on these computers. Linux kernel version 3.8.2 with
enabled mobility options is compiled and installed on the computers. An open source
implementation of Mobile IPv6 (UMIP) for Linux is used.
Router R1 is used as the heart of the Internet. The WAN ports of other
routers are connected to the LAN ports of R1. Router advertisement is enabled on
all routers. In this testbed, one of the computers (HA) is used that acts as a router
with two network interfaces. The HA uses router advertisement daemon (radvd)
software to advertise the home link prefix in its home link connected to switch1.
Also packet forwarding is enabled on the HA to work like a router. The MN (our
server) has one network interface that, at the first step, is connected to the home
link (by switch1). After preparing UMIP configuration files (mip6d.conf) to setup
all parameters like IPsec (for communication between the MN and the HA) and
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accepting route optimization, for all computers (HA, MN, and CNs), we need to run
the mobility daemons on the HA, the MN, and CNs, respectively.
After registration process between the MN and the HA, we disconnect the MN
from the home link and connect it to router R3 (moving to a foreign network). Then
the MN creates a CoA according to the received router advertisement message, using
the stateless address autoconfiguration, from R3 and sends a BU message to its HA
to bind its CoA to its HoA. After this step we disconnect the HA because the MN
should not be accessible by its HoA so a new CN cannot have access to the MN by
the MN’s HoA. Note that we set an infinite life time for the HoA of the MN.
To start the route optimization mechanism, we need to send a packet from the
MN to each CN. For this purpose we can use a ping command from the MN to each
CN. The route optimization mechanism will be started automatically according to the
Mobile IPv6. Because of using the static shared key method [35] instead of return
routability procedure, we do not need the HA in the route optimization mechanism.
Actually, the MN only needs to send the BU message to each CN and wait to receive
the BA message from the CN. According to the limitations of the static shared key
method, we assume that the MN (our server) is trustable but we still need to find
a way to resist replay attacks and distribution of shared symmetric keys. For this
purpose, in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we want to use IPsec with IKE between the
MN and CNs.
We run an IP address rotator script (Appendix A), on the MN to randomly
generate a new IP address as the CoA of the MN. This program first creates a random
64 bits address and combines it with the highest significant 64 bits of current CoA
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to generate the new CoA. This new CoA is checked to be unoccupied by sending
a neighbor solicitation message before registering it. Then this new CoA will be
registered on the subnet and after that this program removes the previous CoA.
According to the Mobile IPv6, the MN will send the BU message to its CNs to
inform them of its new CoA. The ACK bit of BU messages forces CNs to send back
acknowledgment messages in response to BU messages to make sure that all CNs
receive the BU messages and update their binding cache entries. Therefore, after
each 10 seconds, we have two overhead packets between the MN and each CN as
shown in Figure 2.2. During this update procedure, the MN will not be accessible by
CNs until they receive the BU messages. In fact, a CN will not have access to the
MN during one way delay between the MN and the CN.
When one of the clients reboots, it only needs to wait for the next BU from
the server. After that time, this client will have access to the server’s CoA. To add
new client to our network, we need to send a packet (like ping) from the server
to that client. The server checks its binding update list to send this packet. The
address of this new client will not be found in the binding update list, so the server
automatically starts the route optimization mechanism to the new client. Note that
because we disconnect the HA from the network, the new client cannot send any
packet to the server’s HoA, so this new client will have access to the server after the
server sends a packet to the client. That means, the server should decide whether it
will contact a client or not.
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Figure 2.2: Binding update procedure.

2.3

Performance Evaluation
In this section the overhead and the delay of MTM6D are explained. The delay

caused by the updating procedure because of sending BU messages (handoff delay) has
direct effect on packet loss during address rotations. Note that the acknowledgement
message is sent after the updating procedure and does not have any impact on this
delay.

2.3.1

Overhead
We have two types of overhead:
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• Overhead caused by the updating procedure because of BU and BA messages
(signaling overhead)
• Overhead per each data packet transmission between the MN and a CN.
Here, we explain these overheads and then the overhead of our method is
compared to MT6D.

2.3.1.1

Signaling Overhead

A complete correspondent node registration needs two message transmissions
at a MN:
• BU: 14B (Ethernet header) + 40B (IPv6 header) + 24B (Destination option
header) + 32B (Mobility header) = 110B.
• BA: 14B (Ethernet header) + 40B (IPv6 header) + 24B (Type 2 routing header)
+ 32B (Mobility header) = 110B.
So the total signaling overhead to update each CN with a new CoA is 220
bytes. For example, if we change the CoA each 10 seconds and have 20 CNs, the
signaling overhead is 440B/sec.

2.3.1.2

Transmission Overhead

For each data packet we have 24 bytes extra overhead because of the destination option header and type 2 routing header as explained below:
• Data packet from MN to CN: the HoA of the MN is stored in destination option
header (24B).
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• Data packet from CN to MN: the HoA of the MN is stored in type 2 routing
header (24B).
Note that MT6D encapsulates each packet using UDP to hide the original IP
addresses and uses virtual IP addresses and the overhead of MT6D equals 62 bytes
[28]. In MT6D encapsulation, the Ethernet header is also overwritten to anonymize
the Media Access Control (MAC) addresses. However, MTM6D does not have any
MAC address anonymity because the packet source MAC address will be changed
automatically when it is received by the first router. Therefore, for fair comparison,
we assume only 48 bytes overhead (IPv6 header and UDP header) for MT6D. To
compare the overhead of MT6D and MTM6D, we assume 10 seconds as the rotation
interval.
N = mean number of packets per 10 seconds.
O = Overhead per packet (bytes).
OM T M 6D = [(24B ∗ N ) + 220B]/N = 24B + (220B/N ).
OM T 6D = 48B.
OM T 6D < OM T M 6D if N < 220/24.
So the overhead per packet of MTM6D will be less than MT6D if the mean
number of packets per second is greater than 0.917. This comparison is shown in
Figure 2.3.

2.3.2

Handoff Delay
When a MN changes its CoA, it should update all CNs with the new CoA.

During this procedure, all packets sent by CNs will be dropped because the old CoA
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Figure 2.3: Overhead per packet as a function of number of packets per second.

is removed in the MN’s interface. These dropped packets will be ignored by UDP
or resent by TCP. We want to obtain this handoff delay created by the updating
procedure. Delay is equal to duration from the time sending BU by the MN to the
time receiving BU by a CN that is equal to one way delay between the MN and the
CN.

2.3.2.1

UDP Test

For this test we select one CN to transmit UDP packets to the MN. The
round trip time between the CN and the MN equals 10.625 milliseconds. So the
time duration for updating the CN equals 10.625 milliseconds. The address rotation
interval equals 10 seconds. Therefore, the handoff delay ratio equals (0.010625/10) ≈
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Table 2.1: Comparing packet loss ratio
Number of packets per second Packet Loss Rate
10
0.13%
100
0.15%
1000
0.11%

Table 2.2: Comparing average jitter and delay standard deviation

Without MTM6D
With MTM6D

Average Jitter
(ms)
1.56
1.85

Delay Standard Deviation
(ms)
1.75
74.5

0.11%. Table 2.1 shows the experimental results for various numbers of UDP packets
per second generated by D-ITG [36].
Note that for rotation interval equaling to 10 seconds and round trip time
equaling to 100 milliseconds between a client and the server, the packet loss rate will
be equal to only 1%.

2.3.2.2

TCP Test

In this test the CN generates and transmits TCP packets to the MN. Dropped
packets during the handoff delay are retransmitted by the CN because of not receiving
ACK packets. The CN generates 1000 packets per second and transmits them to
the MN. To show the difference between using and not using MTM6D, we compare
average jitter and delay standard deviation calculated by the server according to the
received TCP packets. The experimental results are shown in Table 2.2.
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To show the real effect of MTM6D on TCP transmissions, we used netcat
to send a 400 MB file from a CN to the MN. We also used tc command, added
simulated network latency to the Linux kernel, to increase the round trip time to 100
milliseconds for obtaining more contrast between both with and without MTM6D.
In the normal situation (without MTM6D) this transmission needs 298740 TCP data
packets and takes 73.03 seconds to be finished. However, we have 2679 retransmissions
because of the packet loss during the handoff delay when using MTM6D. Using some
mathematical calculations, this transmission should be finished after 73.68 seconds
but it took 80.47 seconds. TCP timeouts and congestion avoidance mechanism are
the reasons of this discrepancy. In fact, TCP experiences timeout during the handoff
delay, resends the unacknowledged packets and goes to slow start. This event is
clearly shown in Figure 2.4, a combination of two graphs extracted from Wireshark.
Circles show the time that address rotations occurred (the rotation interval equals 10
seconds).

2.4

Conclusion
To solve security risks of static IP addresses of critical infrastructure servers,

a moving target defense based on Mobile IPv6 is proposed in this chapter. MTM6D
dynamically changes the IP addresses of critical infrastructure servers to defend targeted attacks. Using a combination of available standards, MTM6D eliminates packet
loss because of address collision during address rotations. We used a real network
implementation to evaluate the feasibility and the performance of MTM6D.
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Figure 2.4: Amount of data transmitted as a function of time.

To extend the method introduced in this chapter, we propose in Chapter 4 a
method for eliminating packet loss during address rotation together with implementing dynamic addressing for both peers. In Chapter 3 we combine our method with
an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to provide a dynamic address rotation interval.
So we can have a constant default rotation interval and a dynamic one obtained by
the IDS. It is possible to use the IDS for not sharing address updates with known attackers as well. Another step to improve the security and scalability of our method is
using IPsec with IKE between the MN and CNs. By this improvement, the MTM6D
will resist replay attacks (because of using IPsec) and also will have the automatic
key distribution (because of using IKE).
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CHAPTER 3

SECURE VPN USING MOBILE IPV6 BASED MOVING TARGET
DEFENSE

In this chapter, we propose MVPN, a framework for building secure Virtual
Private Networks (VPNs) with a novel Mobile IPv6 based Moving Target Defense
strategy. Our approach aids a VPN server to combat remote attacks against the
server. By eliminating the static address of the server, we make it difficult for an
attacker to find the server. The server’s address is randomly changed at a certain
interval creating a moving target. At the same time, authenticated clients are updated
through the use of the Binding Update procedure (standard Mobile IPv6 protocol).
One key strength of this approach lies in the fact that the clients do not need to
make any changes or use special software. The testbed experiments show reasonable
packet-loss rates that may occur due to the handoff delay.

3.1

Introduction
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) are commonly used as a means to establish

secure connections across the public network. For the computers that are connected
through secure tunnels, the VPNs provide private network-like confidentiality and
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Figure 3.1: VPN connectivity.

authentication. Though location anonymity is not guaranteed, the security and privacy of the communication is increased. Furthermore, allowing authenticated remote
access to internal resources of an organization is one of the key advantages of using
VPNs.
VPNs are relatively robust in that it is difficult to compromise the security of
the connection without breaking the underlying encryption or finding a vulnerability
in the way the cryptosystem is utilized. However, VPNs are not without vulnerability. Protecting VPNs against remote attacks remains an important challenge. These
remote attacks include special actions which allow attackers to compromise remote
systems. Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and remote exploits are two main categories
of remote attacks. Figure 3.1 shows an example of VPN connectivity. In typical set-
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tings, although firewalls, IPDS, and IPsec can prevent unauthorized access, attackers
have virtually unlimited time to find a way to penetrate the server.
As explained in the previous chapter, we designed a new MTD method called
MTM6D [30]. In MTM6D, we utilize Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [9], where there are
a permanent IP address—Home Address (HoA)—which is used to avoid disrupting
TCP sessions and a temporary IP address—Care-of Address (CoA)—which is used to
connect to other nodes. MTM6D dynamically changes the CoAs of a server to make
it a moving target. Note that the server is not actually mobile; we simply treat it as
if it were a mobile node, and use MIPv6, but the server actually remains stationary.
In MTM6D, we utilized a static shuffling interval of 10 seconds, after which the IP
address is changed.
In this chapter, we propose a hybrid scheme of utilizing the MTM6D approach
along with some intrusion detection scheme to establish a framework for supporting
secure VPNs. In this approach, a dynamically adjustable shuffle time is utilized,
based on the level of trust that we have over the client. We use a long shuffling
interval by default, and shuffle the IP address if an attack is suspected. Furthermore,
in MTM6D, we discussed the issue of internal attack isolation. The idea was to keep
a blacklist of these attackers’ IP addresses. When the IP shuffling is performed, those
that are on the blacklist are not updated with the new IP address. Unfortunately,
if two attackers coordinate such that one of them simply sit there to listen to IP
updates and provide the other attacker who actually performs the attack initiation,
we would only be able to detect the active adversary, and its passive partner would
continue to exist without being detected. In this chapter, we provide a solution to
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this problem. We propose the use of multiple IP addresses that are distributed to the
different users across the available IP address space. More specifically, at its simplest
form, we can assign an IP address to each client. In this way, if the IDS detects an
attack coming through an IP address, we can pinpoint to which covert adversary is
providing others with the updates of the shuffled IP(s).
We test the proposed solution in a testbed setting and measure the impact
of the handoff delay on packet loss rates as the CoAs are shuffled around. We also
outline some of the overhead introduced by our solution. The results show that there
is only a small amount of overhead and packet loss.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The design of our
solution is covered in Section 3.2. We then discuss our test implementation and
results in Section 3.3, followed by our summary/conclusions in Section 3.4.

3.2

Design
We first describe the improvements that we make to the MTM6D scheme,

which is used to build our MTD-enhanced VPN. As discussed, the main feature that
we introduce, to enable a more effective MTD, is the use of multiple IPv6 CoAs bound
to a single host. We treat the server as if it were a mobile node. Then, we use the
HoA as the server’s permanent address. The different CoAs are used to communicate
with different clients. These CoAs are dynamically generated (pseudo-random IP
address selection) and changed after a certain time interval. During each of this
shuffling interval, a new CoA is assigned to each client. The clients are notified via
BU messages.
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As discussed previously, we do not need actual mobility in the server, and we
do not need to utilize the HA. On the server side, MIPv6 parameters need to be
set, and an IP address (with a prefix different from the server’s subnet) for the HoA
needs to be chosen. The HoA prefix being outside of the home router’s subnet allows
us to take advantage of the MIPv6 protocol. When the server receives the route
advertisement messages from its router, the prefix of the homelink will look different
from that of the HoA. Thus, according to MIPv6, the server will see itself sitting in
a foreign network and register a CoA with the router in this network. (In reality, the
router, of course, will still be its home router.)
We randomly generate 64-bit IPv6 addresses and combine them with the prefix
of the home link to create new CoAs. To avoid address collision, the new addresses
are checked against current occupancy via neighbor solicitation messages prior to
registering them on the subnet. Following the MIPv6 protocol, the server will send
BU messages to its clients to notify them of the new CoAs. The server then discards
the previous CoAs. Each client then updates its binding cache with the HoA and
CoA information found in the BU message.
With the HA removed from the VPN operation, new clients cannot contact
the server using the server’s HoA. Recall that the use of a static address (such as the
HoA) leaves the VPN vulnerable to attacks such as DoS attacks. The client needs to
contact the server using an out-of-band request and the server initiates the connection
setup. The choice of the out-of-band method for registration is orthogonal to the work
presented in this chapter, and a number of different solutions can be utilized. For
a corporate VPN, for example, a solution as simple as using authenticated email
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messages can be implemented. The request from a client needs to provide the client’s
IP address and the necessary data for authentication. For example, the server’s public
key can be used to encrypt a digital ticket containing necessary credentials (including
secret keys or passwords), which in turn can be used by the server to generate a unique
ID for the client. Upon receiving a new request from a new client, the server verifies
the client’s credentials. Upon successful verification, the server starts connection
initiation by sending out a ping to the client. The server uses the standard MIPv6
protocol and through the use of the route optimization mechanism, each client is
notified of an active CoA that they can use. The server keeps track of the list of
the clients along with their information about IP address, ID, and mode (normal,
suspicious, or malicious). Each new client is set to the normal mode by default.
Each mode should be assigned a different shuffling interval since the shuffling interval
for the normal mode (tn ) is longer than the shuffling interval for the suspicious mode
(ts ).

3.2.1

Attack Handling
In order to detect potential attacks, an IDS can be utilized on the server.

If an attack or suspicious activity is detected, the VPN system can identify which
client is associated with the CoA used by the attack. The client may be innocent
as the attacker may be performing an IP scan. Therefore, the client is placed in the
suspicious mode. Note that the corresponding shuffling interval is short. If another
attack comes through the CoA assigned to the suspicious client, the client is placed
in the malicious mode. Clients in malicious mode are not updated with new CoAs,
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Figure 3.2: Different operating modes.

Figure 3.3: Design concept of MVPN approach.

resulting in a blacklist-like feature for the VPN. This process is summarized in Figure 3.2. Note that changing the IP address and attempting to re-register does not
provide much advantages for the attacker. During the registration process, when the
credentials verification is performed, the attacker’s new registration will match the
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client information from prior interaction(s) with the server. The new connection to
the client is established using the same mode that the client was under during the
previous session. Hence, a connection request from a client previously in malicious
mode will be denied. Figure 3.3 illustrates the design concept of our overall approach.

3.2.2

Scalability
There are two issues that should be considered with respect to the scalability

of the MVPN solution: (1) the number of IPv6 addresses used by the server, and (2)
updating the shared symmetric keys used for the route optimization procedure.
According to the experimental results found in the literature [37], it is possible
to have 55,000 IPv6 addresses bound to a single computer. It was shown that this
binding can be performed in the amount of time necessary for normal network operation. In the worst case, the VPN can have all of the clients under suspicious mode.
In this case, the shuffling interval would be set to the shortest interval setting. If we
assume ts = 10 seconds, the referenced work shows that the VPN system can have
the IP binding capability of 10,000 addresses every interval (10 seconds). It is important to note that the referenced experiment was performed on a non-server-grade
computer with Intel i7-4770 processor running at 3.4Ghz with 16GB of RAM and
an Intel I217-LM Gigabit Ethernet network card. The number of IP addresses that
can be utilized as CoAs at each interval depends on the number of network interfaces
and/or servers that the VPN server is configured with.
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For updating shared symmetric keys, we propose the use of IPsec with Internet
Key Exchange ver. 2 (IKEv2). The key updates can then take place using a widely
adopted standard protocol, which also allows protection against replay attacks.

3.3

Implementation and Results
We implemented a proof of concept prototype of the improved MTM6D scheme

to demonstrate the feasibility of our MVPN scheme and to evaluate the performance.
Figure 3.4 (which can be compared to Figure 3.1) illustrates our IPv6 testbed. We
used four routers (R1, R2, R3, and R4) and eight computers (with 2.4GHz Intel Core
2 Duo CPU with 4GB DDR2 800MHz RAM) running Ubuntu Linux version 14.04
(with kernel version 3.8.2). We enabled the mobility and compiled the kernel. An
open source implementation of MIPv6 (UMIP) was used. In the topology, R1 is used
to emulate the core of the Internet.
To enable MIPv6, we configured the UMIP by setting up IPsec (using static,
shared keys between the server and the clients) and route optimization. In UMIP,
the parameters are specified in the /usr/local/etc/mip6d.conf file, and the mobility
daemon is run (which may be automated via /etc/init.d as with other daemons on
Linux). In our configuration, the server’s HoA does not have the same prefix as the
advertised prefix of R2 (the router representing the server’s home network). The
server registers a unique CoA on R2 for each new client, and subsequently updates
the client with the new CoA. To facilitate the shuffling mechanism, we modified
UMIP by adding a shuffling management function in the source code. This shuffle
manager periodically checks a client list. For testing we used one second, but it
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Figure 3.4: The network topology of the testbed.

can easily be varied. The client list is a simple text file organized with each row
containing information about each client (IP address, mode, and ID). The default
shuffling interval (tn ) is set to one minute in our test implementation. As illustrated
in Figure 3.4, we utilized seven clients. During testing, the server went through the
process of generating seven different CoAs, removing previous CoAs, and updating
the clients with the new CoA every minute.
To allow flexibility in various deployment scenarios, it is the best to have the
choice of IDS left to the network operators. Therefore, the IDS integration should
be implemented as a plug-in-like module. To this end, either (or both) anomalybased or signature-based detection strategies can be employed. While a number of
effective solutions can be found in the literature, we will use Snort for our discussion as
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Snort [38] is one of the most popular open source, signature-based network intrusion
detection systems. Tools such as Snort can easily be integrated into the MVPN
framework. If any intrusion is detected by Snort, then the attacked IP address will be
extracted from Snort and written to a file. Our new function in UMIP can then check
this file and compare it to the list of clients (binding update list). If a match is found,
the client’s operating mode should be downgraded accordingly (normal to suspicious
or suspicious to malicious). Given that Snort (and other signature-based methods)
has low false positive rates, the downgrade operation (and the corresponding MVPN
actions such as terminating BUs for malicious clients) can be done automatically.
If the network operator is concerned with zero-day vulnerabilities, anomalybased detection may be utilized. Since these methods typically have higher false
positives compared to signature-based methods, the operator may wish to have manual inspection steps introduced before a client is downgraded. This choice and how
the post-detection process is handled is orthogonal to our base framework, and can
be left to the network operator. For testing purposes, we manually edited the text file
and changed the client’s mode (while the server was on-line) to observe the different
shuffling intervals. The effect of a simulated attack is illustrated in Figure 3.5. Each
vertical line represents an IP shuffling event. We used 10 seconds for the suspicious
interval. If a client is in suspicious mode and is not detected as an attacker for the
duration of the normal interval, the client is upgraded back to the normal mode.
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Figure 3.5: Effect of attack on shuffling interval.

3.3.1

Overhead and Optimization
There are two different types of overheads in MVPN. First, there is some

signaling overhead; some extra packets are generated due to CoA notification process,
which involves the BU and BA messages. The ACK bit of BU messages forces clients
to send back acknowledgment messages (BAs) in response to BU messages. This
process ensures that the clients receive the BU messages and update their binding
cache entries. Two packets are generated at every shuffling interval between the server
and the client. Figure 3.6 illustrates the update procedure. To minimize the number
of messages generated and reduce the overhead, it is possible to operate the system
without using BAs under normal operating conditions. If data is received from the
client to the new CoA, the server knows the client received the BU without needing
an explicit BA. Timing-wise, depending on the frequency of data transmissions, the
server may need to keep more than one previous CoA open. However, with the
intrusion detection mechanism previously described, it leaves the system no longer
vulnerable; as soon as an intrusion is detected, the server can request for explicit
BAs from the client and operate accordingly. In the standard protocol, there is a flag
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Figure 3.6: The Binding Update process.

to specify whether a BA is requested for a BU. Therefore, this optimization can be
utilized without any modifications to the standards.
Second, there is transmission overhead; each data packet transmission between
the server and a client incurs some overhead. For each data packet, we have 24 extra
bytes of overhead due to the destination option header or type 2 routing header. We
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also have another 24 bytes of overhead due to the use of IPsec with ESP header.
Note, however, that the extra bytes that come from the use of IPsec is not caused by
our proposed method. Any secure communication utilizing IPsec ESP would incur
the same overhead.
Each of the BU and BA messages is 134 bytes (with IPsec). In the standard
implementation of MIPv6, the BU and BA messages are 110 bytes each. However,
in standard use of MIPv6, there are also four extra messages due to the use of the
return routability mechanism. Therefore, the overhead of route optimization in the
original MIPv6 is equal to 660 bytes.

3.3.2

Handoff Delay
We next discuss the handoff delay, which can result in some packet loss. As the

server shuffles and switches over to the new CoAs at each interval, a small window of
vulnerability exists during which the packets sent by clients (addressed to now defunct
CoAs) will not be delivered. Figure 3.7 illustrates this process. Note that these lost
packets will be ignored by the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and retransmitted
by the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). We measure this handoff delay, which
equals the round trip time between the client and the server, and present packet loss
figures.

3.3.2.1

UDP Test

We utilized one of the clients from our setup to send UDP packets to the
server. The round trip time between the client and the server was set to 200ms.
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Figure 3.7: Dropping packets during the handoff delay.

Therefore, the amount of time that it takes for the CoA update is 200ms. If we set
the shuffling interval to 10 seconds (as was the case in the earlier example with the
suspicious mode), the handoff delay ratio equals (0.200/10) = 2%. The packets that
are lost include those that were generated between the window of 100ms prior to the
issuing of the BU in question and 100ms thereafter. The default shuffling interval (in
the normal mode) of MVPN in our example was 60 seconds. Therefore, the handoff
delay ratio equals (0.200/60) ≈ 0.33%. Table 3.1 shows the experimental results for
different UDP packet generation rates. We utilized D-ITG [36] for packet generation.
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Table 3.1: Packet loss rates (UDP test)
Number of packets
per second
10
100
1000
3.3.2.2

Packet Loss Rate
10s
60s
1.80%
0.33%
1.82%
0.31%
1.79%
0.30%

TCP Test

We also performed experiments to test the effect of the handoff delay while
using TCP. As with the UDP test example, a client generates and sends TCP packets
to the server. The packets that are lost during the handoff are retransmitted; with
TCP, these lost packets do not generate ACK packets, which results in retransmission.
We configured the client to send 1000 TCP packets per second for 50 seconds. Each
packet was 500 Bytes.
During the handoff delay, TCP experiences timeout, resends the unacknowledged packet(s) and goes to slow start. This phenomenon is shown in our test results
(Figure 3.8). The graph shows the handoff delay effect for both 10 second and 60
second shuffling intervals. We placed circles around the areas of interest on each line
that illustrate what we discussed.

3.4

Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a framework for building secure VPNs with

a novel Mobile IPv6 based Moving Target Defense strategy. We showed that our
approach, MVPN, can help a VPN server to thwart attacks against itself by making
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Figure 3.8: Percentage of TCP packets delivered over time.

the server difficult to be found. In order to create a moving target scheme, we removed
the server’s static IP address and utilized temporary IP addresses that keep changing.
The use of CoAs according to the MIPv6 standards allows us to implement such a
solution without modifying anything in the network protocol. Most significantly, no
changes are required of the client and any of the intermediate nodes or routers in the
core of the Internet. Our approach achieves its goals with small overhead in signaling
and transmission, and our tests showed that the packet loss rate is reasonable.
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CHAPTER 4

MOVING TARGET DEFENSE FOR IP-BASED CONTROL

In this chapter, we introduce a framework for building a secure and private
peer to peer communication with a novel Mobile IPv6 based Moving Target Defense
strategy. Our approach aids peer hosts to combat remote cyber-attacks by thwarting
any potential attacks at their reconnaissance stage. The IP address of each host is
randomly changed at a certain interval creating a moving target to make it difficult
for an attacker to find the host. At the same time, the peer host is updated through
the use of the Binding Update procedure (standard Mobile IPv6 protocol). Compared
with existing results that can incur significant packet loss during address rotations,
the proposed solution is lossless. Improving privacy and anonymity for communicating hosts by removing permanent IP addresses from all packets is also one of the
major contributions of this study. Another contribution is preventing black hole attacks and bandwidth depletion DDoS attacks through the use of extra paths between
the peer hosts. Recovering the communication after rebooting a host is also a new
contribution in this chapter. Lab-based simulation results are presented to demonstrate performance of the method in action, including its overheads. The testbed
experiments show zero packet loss rate during handoff delay.
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4.1

Introduction
Nowadays Internet-controlled robots have various scientific uses in healthcare,

military, etc. The strength of this approach lies in the fact that this type of remote
control can be done from unlimited distance through the Internet [39]. In addition,
simplifying communication is another advantage based on leveraging Internet Protocol (IP) as a mature method with a large number of off-the-shelf applications. Note
that communication based on IP is becoming more and more popular in modern
transportation because of its advantages. For example, aircraft such as the Boeing
787 Dreamliner, Airbus A350 and Airbus A380 use Honeywell’s avionic systems with
IP communications [40].
To better understand the advantages of Internet-controlled systems, we may
consider remote control system of an airplane—an uninterruptible autopilot system [41]—that can be used in emergency events like terrorist attempts hijacking
an aircraft. Besides the pilot(s) and onboard sensors, this system can be activated
by authorized government agencies through satellite communications. For reliability
and survivability, the power source of this system is kept separate from the rest of the
aircraft’s circuit breakers. Boeing holds a patent (2006) on uninterruptible autopilot
system geared towards commercial aircraft [41]. Once engaged, no one onboard can
control the aircraft and only a remote controller, like a government agency, is able to
control the aircraft through satellite links. Remote connection through the Internet
provided by satellites is typically employed for the uninterruptible autopilot system.
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Besides all of its advantages, an important drawback of this system is the potential
for cyber-terrorists to hack into an aircraft’s control system.
Figure 4.1a illustrates an abstract view of the current IP connectivity between
an aircraft and the ground station. A secure method to combat remote cyber attacks
will play a critical role in being able to move towards the next generation flight control
systems that can prevent tragic events such as the 9/11 attack. As another example,
assume that we have two private networks that is connected to each other like a VPN
as illustrated in Figure 4.1b. If a remote attacker can penetrate to a gateway, both
subnets of the network will be vulnerable. Therefore, one effective way is preventing
remote attacks against the gateways.
In both examples a secure and private communication between two nodes is
needed. Protecting this peer to peer communication against remote attacks is an important challenge. These remote attacks include special actions which allow attackers
to compromise remote systems. Address-based Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)
attacks and remote exploits are two main categories of remote attacks that need to
know the IP address of their intended target(s).
Motivated by the aforementioned challenge, we proposed a Moving Target
Mobile IPv6 Defense (MTM6D) [30] to prevent remote attacks by IP hopping as a
part of MTD. In MTM6D, we utilize Mobile IPv6 [9], where there is a permanent IP
address—Home Address (HoA)—which is used to avoid disrupting TCP sessions and
a temporary IP address—Care-of Address (CoA)—which is used to connect to other
nodes. MTM6D dynamically changes the CoA of a host for moving the target. Note
that we treat the host as if it were a mobile node of Mobile IPv6. MTM6D needs
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4.1: Different applications of the proposed method. (a) Avionic systems
as an example of remote control through the Internet. (b) Connection between two
separate private networks.
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a small modification in the standard Mobile IPv6 protocol. Providing dynamic IP
addresses only on one node among two connected nodes is the major shortcoming of
MTM6D. More clearly, MTM6D cannot protect both peers against remote attacks in
the problem subject to investigation. Another shortcoming of MTM6D is incurring
significant packet loss (on high latency communication links) during address rotations.
Lack of privacy and anonymity for communicating hosts is also another shortcoming
of MTM6D. Note that the permanent IP address should be stored in the home address
option/the routing header type 2 (IPv6 headers) of each data packet that shows the
HoA of the source/destination. Therefore, Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks that
need to target specific IP address(es) and other types of attacks against node’s privacy
can occur.
In this chapter a new version of MTM6D (MTM6D II) is presented to resolve
the above shortcomings. Furthermore, we propose a way for preventing black hole
attacks, as a part of DoS attacks (in which a compromised router on the path between
two hosts discards packets instead of forwarding them) and bandwidth depletion
DDoS attacks (that only need the subnet ID instead of the exact IPv6 address of a
target). A method is also presented to recover the communication after rebooting a
host.
The proposed method (MTM6D II) is designed to meet the following requirements:
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• A static IP address is needed to be transparent to the upper layers. However,
the static IP address should not be accessible through the Internet. In this way,
Dynamic IP address should be used for connecting to the peer node.
• Changing the dynamic IP address should not cause any delay or packet loss in
the network.
• Rotating IP addresses should be done independently on each node. Therefore,
a mechanism is needed to update the peer node with the new IP address.
• The new method should also support dynamic address rotation interval such
as a shorter rotation interval during suspicious activity and a longer one to
decrease the overhead.
• Adding new requirements or any change in the network equipment should be
avoided.
• Mobility between subnets that changes the prefix of IP addresses should be
supported.
• A combination of standard protocols should be used instead of creating a new
protocol given the point that the new protocol can add new vulnerabilities and
may have security or scalability problems.
The last requirement listed above has an important role on security and scalability. We will show that the proposed method uses IPsec with IKEv2 [42] instead
of defining a new protocol. IPsec with IKEv2 is used for encryption, authentication,
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key distribution/rekeying, and replay attacks protection. As the result, the proposed
method does not depend on a specific algorithm or key size for encryption, authentication, and key distribution. This portability feature helps us to implement this
method for different applications like small low-power Internet of Things (IoT) devices. For example, the choice of cryptographic algorithms is left to negotiation steps
of IKEv2 to select an algorithm that both parties support.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Over the next section
the proposed solution and results of testing with a prototype implementation are
presented. Finally, some conclusions are offered and the future work is discussed.

4.2

Proposed Solution
As discussed before, the focus of this chapter is on preventing remote attacks

against two hosts connected through the Internet. Towards this goal, we leverage a
network layer moving target defense to prevent each host being targeted for exploitation. Note that each host can be a computer, a low-power IoT device, a network
gateway, a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) or a Human Machine Interface
(HMI) of Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.
To better understand the need for the proposed method, it needs to be answered why we need an MTD method when we have other defensive measures like
IPsec. The MTD method is necessary because IPsec with an Internet key exchange
method, like IKEv2 is a computer program that could be threatened by zero day
vulnerabilities. For example, a UDP port needs to be open to start IPsec/IKE. This
open port can be targeted by DoS attacks or buffer overflow vulnerabilities [43].
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Therefore, one effective way is preventing a system from being targeted for attacks,
i.e., preventing attacks at the reconnaissance step instead of letting attackers to find
the system and its open ports and start testing different ways for penetration. More
clearly, the proposed idea is moving around (in the huge address space of IPv6) as
fast as possible instead of staying in the same place to be targeted by attackers. Note
that we use IPsec/IKEv2 in the proposed method as a Defense in Depth and to remove permanent IP addresses in order to improve privacy and anonymity. However,
attackers need to find the dynamic IP addresses of our systems in the first step, a task
which is not easy to accomplish. For example, with less than half a second round
trip time between two hosts, we can dynamically change their IP addresses in an
unpredictable way each two seconds. This way, attackers need to find the current IP
addresses between about 18 quintillion choices (if we use 64 bits of IPv6 address size
for the interface identifier) during less than two seconds. This is nearly impossible
with the available equipment like trying to find a tiny needle in a giant haystack in
a very short time. Therefore, even an unpatched implementation of IPsec/IKE with
well-known vulnerabilities cannot be easily targeted in the proposed method.
Mobile IPv6 [9] is employed as the base of the proposed method. The hosts
(hereafter referred to as MN1 and MN2) act like MNs of Mobile IPv6. HoAs of the
MNs are used as the permanent IP addresses to be transparent to the upper layers.
CoAs of the MNs are used as the dynamic IP addresses of the hosts. Random IP
address rotator is implemented to dynamically change the CoAs for moving targets.
Other reasons that Mobile IPv6 is selected are:
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• Mobile IPv6 enables each host to cache the binding of a permanent peer’s IP
address with its dynamic IP address and then send all packets destined for the
peer directly to it using this dynamic IP address.
• Binding update mechanism is useful to inform each host of the current peer’s
dynamic IP address.
• Hosts use the new peer’s dynamic IP address only after receiving the BU message from the peer. So this new IP address has already been successfully registered by the peer. Therefore, there is no chance for packet loss due to address
collision.
Note that accessibility of HoAs (permanent IP addresses) through the Internet
leaves the hosts vulnerable to be targeted. This accessibility is only possible via the
HAs. Therefore, the HAs should be removed in the proposed method. However, the
HAs are needed for the return routability procedure in order to test the HoAs. To
solve this issue we should use another method that does not need the return routability
procedure. For this purpose, as another contribution of this work, we utilize RFC
4449 [35] along with IPsec, and IKEv2 in order to create a Secure Route Optimization
(SRO) method without HA participation. SRO is not only useful for our MTD but
also can be used for other applications of Mobile IPv6. More specifically, if the MN is
trustable, SRO can be employed to decrease signaling overhead and remove the HA
participation. This new method is explained in details next.
In RFC 4449, a static shared key method is presented to omit all messages
related to the return routability procedure. We leverage this approach, which results
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in significant improvements. An MN can update the peer with a new CoA directly
because the HA is not involved in the route optimization mechanism. Another improvement is decreasing signaling overhead because only BU and BA packets are
needed. Along with these advantages, the static shared key method also has some
limitations:
• The peer needs to trust the actions of the MN and needs to assume that the
MN will not launch flooding attacks against a third party as described in [44].
• Static shared symmetric keys between the peer hosts are needed. Therefore,
this method cannot resist replay attacks.
To solve the first issue, we assume that both parties are trustable. This is
not a restrictive assumption, as the peers in the problem subject to investigation
are actually trustable. To address the second issue, we combine RFC 4449 with
IPsec and IKEv2 between both parties because IKEv2 can provide automatic key
distribution/rekeying and protection against replay attacks.
In SRO, BU/BA messages are protected by IPsec so the binding authorization
data (and nonce indices options) are not needed in the mobility header (the extension
header of IPv6) [9]. However, the receiver needs a way to verify the claimed identity
(CoA in the source of IPv6 packet) of the sender. We have two solutions for this
authentication requirement:
• Using Authentication Header (AH) besides Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP).
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4.2: Mobility header format for (a) binding update message and (b) binding
acknowledgement message.

• Using Alternate Care-of Address option for BU messages encrypted by ESP.
As the default, we propose to use IPsec ESP in transport mode for encrypting
both signaling and data packets. Therefore, between the two options, the second one
has a better performance. In this way, a copy of the CoA, which is used in the source
of IPv6 packet, is automatically encrypted by ESP. Note that the alternate care-of
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address option is a part of mobility header that is automatically encrypted by ESP.
Mobility header format for BU and BA packets are shown in Figure 4.2.
We still have a problem for removing HAs because according to the standard
Mobile IPv6, each MN should send a BU message to the HoA of another MN. This
packet is received by the HA of the destination MN and is tunneled to that MN as
illustrated in Figure 4.3. After that, they can communicate using their CoAs without
participation of the HAs. If an MN changes its CoA, it should subsequently send a
BU message to the HoA of another MN. To solve this problem and have the process
given by Figure 4.4, instead of the one given by Figure 4.3, each MN should check
the Binding Cache when it wants to send a BU message. Therefore, MNs can send
BU messages directly to the CoA of the peer without using HAs. We also need to
force MNs to check BUL before sending BA messages in order not to use their HoAs
as the source of BA messages.
Other modifications in the standard Mobile IPv6 protocol for the proposed
method are presented below:
• IPsec is leveraged for encryption and as a proof of HoA ownership for SRO
process. In this way, receiving a BU message protected by IPsec is a proof of
HoA ownership. Note that when IPsec is used between two peers, every packet
de facto contains a simple piece of information (Security Parameter Index) that
gives access to address information (HoAs) for both peers and the shared key.
Through the use of SRO process HAs are not needed and consequently the HoAs
(permanent IP addresses) are not accessible as shown in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.3: Standard Binding Update process between two MNs.

• Each new CoA is created and announced by a BU message before removing the
previous CoA. In fact, the previous CoA will be removed after receiving the BA
message from the peer. More specifically, each MN constantly generates a new
CoA and registers it after checking against current occupancy (via Neighbor
Solicitation message). Then the MN sends a Ping Request packet from the new
CoA to the IP address of its home router. In this way, the new CoA (with the
MAC address) is stored in the table of the home router (to avoid any delay
for the first packet with this CoA as its destination). Following the Mobile
IPv6 protocol, the MN sends a BU message and after receiving the relevant BA
message, the MN will remove the previous CoA.
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Figure 4.4: Binding Update process using Binding Cache between two MNs.

Using the proposed method, we can prevent attacks that need to target specific
IP address. However, we still have problem with two other types of attacks: (1) black
hole attack as a part of DoS attacks (in which a compromised router on the path
between two hosts discards packets instead of forwarding them) and (2) bandwidth
depletion DDoS attack (that only needs the subnet ID instead of the exact IPv6
address of a target). To prevent these attacks we need to have more than one path
between hosts. For example, consider an MN that has two different physical interfaces,
one connected to a Cellular link and the other to an Ethernet link. In turn, the MN
is connected to two routers that act as foreign networks in Mobile IPv6. In this
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Figure 4.5: The process of removing accessibility of HoAs.

case, the MN can easily switch between these two links. For this purpose, the MN
needs to register its next CoA on the second link and updates the peer with this new
CoA. Therefore, the next data packets will be sent and received through the second
link. Hence, the handover delay because of changing links is zero. As a suggestion, a
keepalive signal can be used between two MNs to check that the link between them is
operating. If the link is broken or the link delay is more than a threshold, each peer
can switch between their routers. As another suggestion, the second link can always
be used as a redundant path.
To implement extra paths, the IPv6 address prefixes of routers of each path
should be stored as different preferences. When switching between paths is needed,
each host needs to switch between IPv6 address prefix preferences. Note that in our
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Figure 4.6: IP address rotator flowchart.

modification the old CoA should still be accessible until receiving the BA message
from the peer host for the new CoA. Therefore, the probability of packet dropping
due to the change of paths (subnets) is zero.
The flowchart of IP address rotator is shown in Figure 4.6. A new generated
CoA should be tested to make sure that it is a free IP address by sending a Neighbor
Solicitation message. The default waiting time to detect an address collision can be
calculated as 1.5 times the value of RetransTimer (default: 1 second), times the value
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of DupAddrDetectTransmits (default: 1). RetransTimer and DupAddrDetectTransmits are specified in Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 [6] and Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration [5], respectively. So, if a Neighbor Advertisement message is not
received during 1.5 seconds, the CoA will be registered. To remove any delay, the
new CoA will be added to the router table by sending a Ping Request message from
this new CoA to the IP address of the router. When the router receives the ping
request, it will send a Neighbor Solicitation message because it does not have the new
CoA in its table. Upon receiving the Neighbor Advertisement message from the MN,
the router will send back a Ping Reply message. Now the new CoA is registered and
ready to use. After that, a BU message is sent to the peer host. If the BA message
is not received (as the confirmation of the BU message) after two retry (number of
retries depends on the network parameters), a new CoA should be created on the
next router (if exists). Recall that the previous CoA is removed after receiving BA
message from the peer host.
Ws in the flowchart is the waiting time for the next shuffling period. The fastest
shuffling interval can be occurred if we select zero for Ws . Note that the length of
Ws is a network parameter that can be selected independently and dynamically on
each peer host. The shorter Ws , the more signaling overhead but the more resilient
to attacks. As a suggestion, a longer Ws can be selected as the default value and
if an attack or suspicious activity is detected by anomaly-based or signature-based
detection strategies, Ws should be decreased. The minimum shuffling interval is
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suggested in this study to be calculated through the following equation.

(P c + 1) × (T c + 1.5s + 2 × RT T (M Ni , Routeri ))

(4.1)

+ Te + RT T (M N 1, M N 2)
where RT T (M N 1, M N 2) equals the mean round trip time between MN1 and MN2.
Tc is the mean calculation time for generating a random IP address and creating
packets. Te is the time needed for encrypting a BU packet by IPsec. Pc is the
probability of address collision. To estimate the minimum shuffling interval, we should
note that Pc is very small because of the huge address space of IPv6. Furthermore,
Tc and Te are negligible in comparison with the network delay. Therefore, according
to (Equation (4.1)), if RT T (M N 1, M N 2) >> RT T (M Ni , Routeri ), then, 1.5s +
RT T (M N 1, M N 2) dominates the minimum shuffling interval.
The final scheme of the proposed method is shown in Figure 4.7. Recall that
this method is a combination of Mobile IPv6, IPsec with IKE v2, and multiple CoAs
registration. We next explain the initialization steps, security, and privacy of the
proposed method.

4.2.1

Initialization Steps
In this subsection we present the initialization steps to start the communication

between peer hosts (MNs). In the first step, the HoA of each MN should have a prefix
different from that of the MN’s subnet received by Route Advertisement messages. As
such, the MNs will see themselves sitting in foreign networks and will subsequently
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Figure 4.7: Final scheme of the proposed method.

register default CoAs in these networks. In the next step, a manual exchange of
configuration information is needed that includes a default CoA of the peer and preshared key. Default CoAs are used to set the first entries of the Binding Cache and the
BUL in both MNs. The pre-shared key is used for IKE AUTH Exchange of IKE v2.
Note that other methods of authentication can also be used for IKE v2 instead of
pre-shared key. These methods of authentication include RSA certificates, elliptic
curve digital signature algorithm certificates, and extensible authentication protocol.
After these two steps, the MNs can start the IP address rotator to change their CoAs.
If one of the peers (MN1) reboots, another peer (MN2) should use its default
CoA and wait for the first packet from MN1. Then both of them can start the IP
address rotator. Reboot of a peer can be detected by not receiving BA messages or
the keepalive signal (if any) through all existing paths.
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4.2.2

Security of Mobile IPv6
Here we explain some possible attacks against the standard Mobile IPv6 route

optimization mechanism [44]. Furthermore, we compare protection solutions used by
Mobile IPv6 and the proposed method.
First, if the route optimization mechanism was not authenticated, an attacker
could send spoofed BU messages from anywhere on the Internet. As a result, the
attacker could redirect all packets between the MN and CNs to itself (attack against
secrecy and integrity) or to an arbitrary IP address (flooding attack). In Mobile IPv6,
these types of attacks are not possible due to the use of authentication in the return
routability procedure. The proposed method is also resistant to these types of attacks
because of using SRO that leverages IPsec for authenticating BU messages. Recall
that ESP header encrypts the alternate care-of address option of each BU message.
In this way a receiver can authenticate each BU message by comparing the source IP
address in the packet header with the encrypted IP address in the alternate care-of
address option.
Second, one of the most critical attacks against the standard Mobile IPv6 is
the inducing of unnecessary binding updates. Unfortunately, the use of authenticated
BU messages cannot prevent this type of attack. The impact of the attack becomes
more severe as more resources are consumed by the route optimization mechanism.
According to default parameters of Mobile IPv6 protocol, when an MN receives a
packet from a new CN via its HA, the MN should start the return routability procedure. This procedure is started by creating a new entry in the BUL and sending two

78

packets to the CN (the Home Test Init and Care-of Test Init). These two packets
will be retransmitted if the MN does not receive Home Test and Care-of Test packets
from the CN after a retransmission interval. The retransmission interval is based
on an exponential back-off process in which the initial retransmission timer is set
to INITIAL BINDACK TIMEOUT (default: 1 second) and is doubled upon each retransmission, until the timeout period reaches the value MAX BINDACK TIMEOUT
(default: 32 seconds). This process is finished after 210 seconds as the default life
time of the BUL entry (MAX TOKEN LIFETIME) [9].
An attacker can exploit the retransmission process by sending a spoofed packet
to the HoA of an MN. The spoofed packet should look like as if it comes from a new
CN. This packet is tunneled to the MN via its HA. Once the MN receives the packet
it starts the route optimization mechanism with this fake CN. As the result, the MN
repeats sending two packets eleven times, and subsequently removes the entry from
its BUL. Therefore, if an attacker induces an MN to initiate the route optimization
mechanism with a non-existent CN, the MN will send 22 packets while keeping the
corresponding entry in the table for 210 seconds. In practice, the attacker would
trigger the MN to initiate a large number of route optimizations with fake CNs.
We simulated this attack against the standard Mobile IPv6. For this purpose,
we used Scapy [45], a powerful interactive packet manipulation program, to send some
Ping Request packets with a random IP address in the source of the packet. The prefix of these random addresses was the same as the attacker’s address prefix to avoid
ingress filtering. In this test, we created a flooding attack for 32 seconds with 12,800
Ping Request packets to the HoA of an MN. In our experiments, the MN sent a Ping
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Replay packet per each received request packet and also sent 281,600 (12,800×22)
packets during the retransmission process of the return routability procedure. Therefore, forcing the MN to send 294,400 (281,600 + 12,800 Ping Replay) packets during
242 seconds was the result of this attack.
However, it is not possible to launch this attack against the proposed method
because we do not use any HA and accordingly, peers are not accessible by their
HoAs. Hence, even though the Mobile IPv6 is used, the above vulnerability is not
inherited to the proposed method. This is a significant result in terms of security of
the method.

4.2.3

Privacy Improvement via IPsec
When an MN (MN1) wants to send a data packet to another MN (MN2), it

will have already supplied the HoAs as the source and destination addresses in the
packet header. Next, MN1 checks the BUL to see if it has already sent a BU message
to MN2. If it is found, MN1 includes its CoA in the home address option. MN1
then checks its binding cache to see if MN2 has sent a BU message to MN1. If it is
found, MN1 constructs a routing header type 2 and places the CoA of MN2 inside
this header. The packet with HoAs in the source and destination addresses of the
header reaches IPsec. After encrypting and adding headers, the home address option
is swapped with the source address and the routing header type 2 is swapped with
the destination address of the packet header. When the packet is received by MN2,
the headers are processed in the order that they appear in the packet. Therefore,
HoAs are inserted in the source and destination addresses of the packet header before
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Figure 4.8: Sending packets processing flowchart.

the packet reaches IPsec. In this way, the IPsec implementation always sees HoAs in
the source and destination addresses of the packet header. Note that it is the best to
use HoAs as the selectors in IPsec to avoid changing the Security Association (SA)
every time a new CoA is defined [46, p. 116-119].
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Figure 4.9: Received packets processing flowchart.

According to the standard implementation of Mobile IPv6 and IPsec, when a
packet is on the path, the source and destination addresses in the header are CoAs
of MN1 and MN2. However, IPsec does not encrypt the routing header type 2 and
the home address option that show HoAs of the source and destination. To improve
the privacy we can resolve this problem by removing the destination option header
(and the routing header type 2) from all packets. Note that the Security Parameter
Index (SPI) found in the ESP header is sufficient to get access to the HoAs (the real
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4.10: Packet format before (a) and after (b) removing the destination option
header and the routing header type 2.

source/destination of a packet). The highlighted parts in the flowcharts in Figure 4.8
and Fig. Figure 4.9 show our modification in the standard MN operation with IPsec
(HAO and RH2 in these flowcharts are the home address option and the routing header
type 2, respectively). The packet format before and after removing the destination
option header/the routing header type 2 are shown in Figure 4.10.
We propose the use of IKEv2 as a standard method for key management.
IKEv2 can improve the security of IPsec and prevent replay attacks. To start IKEv2,
some negotiations should be done between peers to define SPIs (a total of four messages). After that, we can remove HoAs in the source peer and retrieve them via SPIs
in the destination peer. Therefore, the destination option header/the routing header
type 2 are only needed for the first four messages. Recall that a pre-shared key can
be used for IKE AUTH Exchange that is the first step of IKEv2. The details are out
of the scope of this work.
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4.3

Implementation Results
A proof of concept prototype implementation of the proposed method is devel-

oped to prove the validity and evaluate the performance of the design. Two computers
containing 2.4GHz Intel Core 2 Duo CPU with 4GB DDR2 800MHz RAM are used
as two hosts (MN1 and MN2). Ubuntu 14.04 is installed on these computers. Linux
kernel version 3.8.2 with enabled mobility options is compiled and installed on the
computers. An open source implementation of Mobile IPv6 (UMIP) for Linux is
used. Some changes have been done on the original UMIP to support the proposed
method. Router R1 is used as the heart of the Internet. The WAN ports of other
routers (R2 and R3) are connected to the LAN ports of R1. The prefix of each HoA
is different from the prefix received by Route Advertisement messages. So MNs see
themselves sitting in foreign networks and subsequently register CoAs in these networks. The network topology of the testbed is illustrated in Figure 4.11. A function
is added to the source code of UMIP for changing CoAs of the MNs each 10 seconds.
We compared this new version of MTM6D (MTM6D II) with the previous version of
MTM6D [30] and MT6D method [28]. Having zero packet loss in MTM6D II is the
best advantage in comparison with MTM6D as explained in Section 4.3.2.

4.3.1

Overhead
There are two types of overheads in MTM6D II. First, there is some signaling

overhead; some extra packets are used due to the CoA notification process (binding
update procedure), which involves the BU and the BA messages. The ACK bit of
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Figure 4.11: The network topology of the testbed.

each BU message forces the peer host to send back a BA message as a confirmation.
This process ensures that the peer host receives the BU message and updates its
binding cache entry before removing the previous CoA by the sender. Each round
of changing IP address needs two message transmissions at each MN (BU and BA
messages). As presented in Section 4.2, we do not use any HA in the proposed method
in order to prevent access to HoAs, i.e., the permanent IP addresses of peers through
the Internet. Therefore, SRO is used as the route optimization method that does
not need the participation of any HA. Considering the mobility header format for
BU and BA messages (shown in Figure 4.2) and the use of SPI of ESP header for
removing the destination option header and the routing header type 2 (presented in
Section 4.2.3), we can calculate the size of BU/BA packets:

BU : 14B(Ethernetheader) + 40B(IP v6header)+
(4.2)
24B(IP sec(ESP )) + 32B(M obilityheader) = 110B.
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BA : 14B(Ethernetheader) + 40B(IP v6header)+
(4.3)
24B(IP sec(ESP )) + 16B(M obilityheader) = 94B.

Therefore, the total signaling overhead to update a peer host with a new
CoA is 204 bytes. For example, if each host changes its CoA each 10 seconds, the
signaling overhead is 40.8B/sec. In the standard implementation of Mobile IPv6, the
BU and BA messages are 110 bytes each. Note that instead of IPsec header, they
have the routing header type 2 and the home address option in each signaling packet.
However, in the standard Mobile IPv6, there are also four extra messages due to the
use of the return routability procedure. Therefore, the overhead of route optimization
in the original Mobile IPv6 is equal to 660 bytes (in comparison with 204 bytes in
the proposed method).
Second, there is transmission overhead; each data packet transmission between
hosts has some overhead. For each data packet, we have 24 extra bytes of overhead
due to the use of IPsec with ESP protocol. Note, however, that the extra bytes that
come from the use of IPsec are not caused by the proposed method. Any secure
communication utilizing IPsec ESP would incur the same overhead. On the other
hand, MT6D encapsulates each packet using UDP to hide the original IP addresses
and uses virtual IP addresses. The overhead of MT6D equals 62 bytes [28]. In
MT6D encapsulation, the Ethernet header is also overwritten to anonymize the MAC
addresses. However, the proposed method does not have any MAC address anonymity
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Figure 4.12: Overhead per packet as a function of number of packets per second.

because the packet source MAC address will be changed automatically when it is
received by the first router. For a fair comparison, we assume only 48 bytes overhead
(IPv6 header and UDP header) for MT6D.
To compare the overhead of MT6D and the proposed method, different shuffling intervals (t) are used. Let Oi be the overhead per each packet for method i and
N be the mean number of packets per second, then we have:

OM T M 6D II = 24B +



408B
N ×t



.

(4.4)

Recall that OM T 6D = 48B. So OM T 6D < OM T M 6D II if (N × t) < 17.
This comparison is shown in Figure 4.12. We used three different shuffling
intervals for MTM6D II in this comparison. Two seconds is used as an approximation
to the minimum value for RTT less than 500 seconds as explained in Section 4.2.
Furthermore, 10 seconds is used as the default value in MT6D. One minute is also
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used as an example for a long shuffling interval. According to these calculations,
when the shuffling interval equals 10 seconds (as an example) and the mean number
of packets per second is greater than 1.7, the overhead per packet of the proposed
method is less than MT6D.

4.3.2

Handoff Delay
In MTM6D and MTM6D II when an MN changes its CoA, it should update

the peer with the new CoA. MTM6D has a small window of vulnerability during the
handoff delay because packets sent by the peer (addressed to now defunct CoA) could
not be delivered. However, in MTM6D II, we use multiple CoAs such that the old
CoA is kept alive until the new CoA has been received by the peer. The old CoA is
removed once the peer node sends back the BA message showing that the new CoA is
saved in the peer. Recall that the handoff delay equals the round trip time between
peers (connection latency times two). Figure 4.13 illustrates this process. In this
figure CoAi is the current CoA of MNi. One IP address rotation of MN1 is shown in
the figure.
In MT6D each host maintains three addresses: the previous interval address,
the current interval address, and the next interval address to eliminate any packet
loss during handoff delay. To better understand the effect of handoff delay on the
communication, we compared MTM6D II with MTM6D in a high latency scenario
like the Internet provided by satellites typically employed for connections between an
aircraft and a ground station as one of the applications of MTM6D II.
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Figure 4.13: Zero packet loss during the handoff delay.

Satellite Internet service is a communication through geostationary satellites
that can offer high data speeds. A geostationary orbit is directly above the earth’s
equator, with a period equal to the earth’s rotational period. Compared to the
ground-based communication, geostationary satellite communications experience high
delay due to the signal that should travel 35,786 km to a satellite in geostationary
orbit and back to the ground again. Even at the speed of light (about 300,000
km/s), this delay is significant. Assuming zero delay for all other signaling, it still
takes a signal about 240 milliseconds (ms), to travel to the satellite and back to the
ground. Note that the delay could be different depending on the position of the
ground station on earth and the altitude of the airplane. Combining this delay with
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Table 4.1: UDP packet loss rate
Number of packets
per second
10
100
1000

Packet Loss Rate
MTM6D MTM6D II
5.80%
0%
5.85%
0%
5.77%
0%

other normal delay from network sources, we assumed 600 ms as the round trip time
in our implementations.

4.3.2.1

UDP test

For this test we selected one MN to transmit UDP packets to another MN. As
mentioned earlier, the time duration for updating the peer equals 600 ms. We used
10 seconds as the shuffling interval for both MTM6D II and MTM6D. Therefore, the
handoff delay ratio equals (0.600/10) = 6%. In MTM6D, all data packets are lost during the handoff, but, in MTM6D II the packet loss rate equals zero. Table 4.1 shows
the experimental results for various numbers of UDP packets per second generated
by a traffic generator.

4.3.2.2

TCP test

For TCP test, one MN is utilized to send 1000 TCP packets per second (each
500B) to another MN. Shuffling interval equals 10 seconds. In MTM6D, the handoff
delay has an important effect on the throughput. During the handoff delay, TCP
experiences timeout, resends the unacknowledged packets and goes to slow start.
However, in the proposed method we do not have any packet loss. As shown in
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Figure 4.14: Percentage of TCP packets delivered over time.

Figure 4.14, the ratio of delivered TCP packets to the sent packets equals 22.96% for
MTM6D (in comparison with 100% in MTM6D II).
Table 4.2 shows a brief comparison between the proposed MTD method (MTM6D
II) and MT6D (the closest method). Significant improvements can be seen in terms
of security, availability, flexibility, independence, etc. Interested readers are referred
to Sections I and II for more details on comparison.

4.4

Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we presented a framework for building a secure and private

peer to peer communication with a novel Mobile IPv6 based Moving Target Defense
strategy. We showed that our approach, MTM6D II, can help thwart remote cyberattacks against peer hosts by making the hosts difficult to be found. Towards this
purpose, dynamic random IP addresses are used instead of static permanent IP ad-
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Table 4.2: Comparison between MTM6D II and MT6D.

Mobility support
Independent IP address rotation
interval
Black hole and bandwidth depletion
DDoS attacks resistancea
Independent encryption,
authentication method, and key-size
Possibility of packet loss
due to address collision
Time synchronization requirement
Signaling overhead per each host
per each rotation interval
Transmission overhead
per each data packet

MTM6D II
✓

MT6D
✗

✓

✗

✓b

✗

✓c

✗

✗

✓

✗

✓

220B

0B

24B

62B

a

Capability of changing links (if any) without connection disruption.
b If a host is connected to two links (as an example) and both of
them are under attack then MTM6D II also cannot prevent these
attacks.
c Different algorithms and key-size can be used based on IPsec
with IKE v2.

dresses. Furthermore, we utilize RFC 4449 along with IPsec/IKEv2 for creating a
secure route optimization (SRO) method without participation of any HA. Applications of this new route optimization method are not limited to the proposed MTD
method but also can be used for other applications of Mobile IPv6. Removing the
destination option header (and the routing header type 2) from all packets is proposed
to improve privacy and anonymity for communicating hosts and decrease overhead.
As another security improvement, using extra paths between the peer hosts with the
ability to switch between these paths without any delay or packet loss is proposed
to combat black hole and bandwidth depletion DDoS attacks. Use of combination of
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standard protocols instead of creating a new protocol made the proposed method to
be independent of a specific algorithm or key size for encryption, authentication, and
key distribution. This portability feature makes it easy to implement this method for
different applications. The end result is a solution that may also be combined with
existing defensive measures to form a robust Defense in Depth solution.
Although the results presented in this work claimed to outperform the recent
results of MT6D method, the scalability issue of both methods remains to be investigated. The most significant part of future work is adopting the presented MTD
method to support one-to-many and many-to-many communications like controlling
multiple robots via one (or many) remote controller(s).
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CHAPTER 5

ANTI-CENSORSHIP FRAMEWORK USING MOVING TARGET
DEFENSE

Although the Internet has become a hub around which every aspect of our
lives—from commerce to leisurely activities—is centered, many people around the
world are not able to freely access information over the Internet. Some governments
censor what the people can and cannot see. In this chapter, regardless of the sociopolitical view points, we focus on the design of anti-censorship technology that can
be implemented on the side of the information purveyors.
The primary objective is to develop a framework for combating censorship.
Our approach aims to make it too expensive and impractical for the adversary to
censor web sites. Specifically, we propose the use of Mobile IPv6 to form a moving target defense strategy, where the web servers logically behave as if they are the
mobile nodes (without actually moving). The potential efficacy of this framework is
modeled analytically. Probabilistic models are used to derive important metrics and
parameters. One key factor termed swarming ratio enables hosting sites to reason
about the amount of resources needed to force the adversary’s costs over practical
limits. This model is used to guide the performance goals and architectural setup
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of the prototype implementation (modifications are made on the server-side software
and kernel without changing the standard Mobile IPv6 protocol). Hence, the solution
can be utilized without any changes to the existing network infrastructure. Furthermore, we introduce a novel, credit-based accounting strategy for grouping of users
to drastically shift resource requirements in our favor. Lab-based tests are used to
measure performance overheads, and, based on the findings, targeted optimizations
are performed to consider practical deployment scenarios. The end result is a solution
that may also be combined with existing anti-censorship methods (that are end-user
based and/or assisted by friendly network assets) to form a robust anti-censorship
solution.

5.1

Introduction
Over the past decade, widespread access to the Internet has led to significant

changes in the way people live. The power of having information that can be readily
accessed via a computer or a mobile device has prompted never-before-seen rate of
advances in science, technology, and cultural transformations. Though some may
also argue the downsides of the Internet, it has enabled all communities around the
globe to come much closer together than ever before. Unfortunately, the freedom to
access information—which is considered a basic human right by most cultures and
their respective laws—is not protected for some people in various parts of the world
today. Freedom of information is a key to a free, democratic society. In addition to
fueling the transformations as described above, it symbolizes a fundamental struggle
towards betterment of mankind. As such, some have even argued that the right to
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access information should be a welfare right: that the burden of guaranteeing such
access to its citizens should be placed on the government [47]. Through the use
of technology, it is possible to combat censorship, and help people from all around
the globe access information that can ultimately help them reach their potential in
all areas of science, technology, digital culture, etc. This research work presents a
framework through which web servers can combat censorship.
The adversary may be a government body or a private group trying to prevent
people from accessing certain types of information. Our goal is to make it difficult
for any entity to prevent the public from accessing web-hosted information.
There are several ways that information on the web is currently censored.
Some common techniques include:
• IP address blocking: Block access to certain sites as identified by their IP
address(es).
• Domain Name System (DNS) filtering: Certain domain names are not resolved,
preventing access.
• Uniform Resource Locator (URL) filtering: URL strings are scrutinized regardless of the domain name.
• Packet filtering: Network packet payloads are monitored for forbidden terms.
• Network Disconnection: Censorship is achieved by turning off the network infrastructure.
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The last item—complete network disconnection for some—is seldom implemented in
practice, but there are no solutions other than finding another way to get on to the
Internet. Thus, complete disconnection is outside the scope of this research. Most
users go around the other four censorship methods by utilizing encrypted tunnels
and proxies, such as VPNs [48–50] and Tor [51]. In response, the adversary typically
attempts to find and block the hosts of these services.
In this chapter, we present a solution based on a combination of the features
present in Mobile IPv6 and a moving target defense (MTD) strategy. This framework
is designed to be implemented at the servers hosting the content. We use the basic
ideas behind MTD approaches that were designed to prevent Distributed Denialof-Service (DDoS) attacks by detecting flooding attacks where the intended victims
(servers) are turned into moving targets for attack isolation [17–19]. Such methods
were also used to improve user privacy [28]. (In the related work section, we discuss the lack of suitability of these existing MTD approaches for the anti-censorship
problem.) Our approach is different from the existing attempts to thwart Internet
censorship measures where the end-users or some entities in the network attempt
to combat censorship efforts (either individually, or as a community). Our solution
leverages the participation of the hosting server, and is orthogonal to the existing
methods. In fact, we believe that the joint-use of the different schemes could yield an
extremely robust solution.
Typically in Mobile IPv6, a permanent IP (home address) is used to avoid
disrupting TCP sessions and one or more care-of addresses (CoA) are used to connect
to the other nodes [9]. We use Mobile IPv6, and treat the web server as if it were a
97

mobile node. Servers can then utilize dynamically changing IP addresses (based on
the CoAs) to avoid filtering and blocking (and also from being attacked). End-users
are assigned to random groups and provided with a CoA that they can use to access
the website. After some time interval (called shuffling interval), we generate new sets
of CoAs and re-randomize the user groups and update them with the new CoAs. In
Figure 5.1, we illustrate the basic scheme. On the server-side, n different CoAs are
utilized with three IPs (IP1 , IP2 and IPn ) explicitly shown. Each CoA is assigned to a
randomly chosen group of users. After shuffling, the users will be re-grouped and will
be connected via newly generated CoAs. The efficacy of the basic scheme depends on
the number of CoAs utilized and the number of agents of the adversary pretending
to be normal users. These agents will seek out the CoAs in order to block them. By
changing the CoAs, and shuffling the users, we provide a moving target. By utilizing a
novel, cost-based shuffling method, we make it cost-inhibitive for the adversary to try
to outnumber the system. Our method leverages the existing Mobile IPv6 technology,
such that it is not required to modify existing Mobile IPv6 standard/protocol.
In [33], we presented the basic framework and analysis. In this work, in addition to editorial changes, we also include the following significant extensions/updates:
• Updated explanation and analysis.
• Co-location of mirrors with other sites.
• User registration mechanism: (1) coalition with uncensored sites (2) multiple
reCAPTCHA with random timing for user registration control.
• Use of IPsec with IKEv2.
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CoAs:
IP1
IP2

Internet

IPn

Figure 5.1: For illustration purposes, n different randomly chosen CoAs are assigned
to different groups of users; three user groups assigned to IP1 , IP2 , and IPn are
highlighted.

• Behavior monitoring and intelligent user grouping based on credit/risk based
accounting that allows significant reduction in the number of CoAs needed
during operation.
• Signaling overhead reduction.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Over the next section,
we provide an overview of the related work in anti-censorship efforts and moving
target defense. We then present the basic framework of our solution, including an
analytical model, and results of testing with a prototype implementation. We also
present improvements to the framework and explain the benefits. Finally, we offer
some conclusions, and discuss our ongoing and future works.

5.2

Related Work
In this section, we discuss two categories of related work: (1) Anti-censorship

methods and (2) MTD methods.
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5.2.1

Anti-Censorship Methods
End users utilize proxies and encrypted tunnels to get around the problem of

censorship. Some notable examples include VPNs [48–50], open HTTPS proxies, and
different types of anti-censorship tools such as Tor [51]. Unfortunately, the adversary
can thwart the use of these solutions by blocking the IP addresses of the systems on
which these services run. For example, traffic to and from Tor relays can be easily
filtered, since their IP addresses are publicly advertised. The maintainers of the Tor
project have thus suggested the use of bridges, which through relay-like functionality, do not advertise their presence and reachability information through directory
services. However, encrypted bridge traffic can also be identified [52]. Thus, systems such as Skypemorph [53] and Stegotorus [54], suggest ways of camouflaging Tor
messages through various unrelated, cover protocols (e.g., VoIP). These camouflaging
methods can also be detected [55].
Recently, a solution called decoy routing was introduced [56]. Unlike traditional methods where the proxies reside at the ends of the network paths, this solution
relies on placing the proxies in the middle. There are several variations that can be
found in the literature including Cirripede [57], TapDance [58], and Telex [59]. Internet service providers (ISP) that participate in decoy routing place special routing
equipment that filters out specially marked messages (which are destined to decoy
destinations) and redirects them towards the actual destination (which is censored).
The realization of these schemes is dependent on the ability of the participating ISPs
to filter traffic between the end-user and the decoys. The filtering process is not
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computationally cheap, requiring the addition of hardware resources. This overhead
also results in increased latency. Though TapDance is designed to function without
this blocking at the ISPs, it is vulnerable to active attacks that do not affect other
schemes. Current decoy routing systems are also vulnerable to traffic analysis or
website fingerprinting. Finally, in [60], a scheme for routing adversaries against the
decoy routing strategy was introduced. The authors showed that the end-users can
be forced onto paths lacking the special routers from the friendly ISPs. The use of
several different class of solutions (including the one we propose in this chapter) in
conjunction is likely to yield a stronger solution.

5.2.2

MTD Methods
We briefly discuss two different MTD-based methods that protect servers

against attacks (e.g., DDoS) and discuss why they cannot be used (at least in their
existing form) to address anti-censorship.
First, a cloud-based defense mechanism was introduced in [19] for Internet
services against DDoS attacks. This solution was based on performing selective server
replication and intelligent client reassignment, where the victim servers were turned
into moving targets for attack isolation. The attacked server instances are replaced
with new replicas at different network locations, and the clients are migrated to
the new server instances. The attacked servers are recycled after client migration is
completed. The new locations are only known to clients that have been migrated
to them. The DNS service is used to redirect incoming clients to the cloud domains
where the protected servers are deployed.
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To reach the protected server, a client first needs to go through the DNS for
domain resolution. In this step, the DNS refers the client to the cloud domain, where
load balancers are used to redirect the clients. Each load balancer keeps records
about the active replica servers within the same domain and redirects new clients to
the servers. To achieve redirection-based load balancing, the load balancer replies to
each client’s requests with the unique network location of the server that the client
now belongs to. The server is also notified; the client is then whitelisted on the server.
If there is a DDoS attack on some of the servers, new replicas are instantiated and
the clients are reassigned across the set of replacement servers.
We now discuss the limitations in adapting this method for anti-censorship
(instead of using it for DDoS protection). The shortcomings can be summarized as:
• The censors can perform (1) IP blocking and/or (2) DNS filtering and redirection to prevent access to the load balancers.
• Detecting the censor amongst the normal clients is difficult; all users grouped
with a censor are blocked perpetually.
• DDoS requires large volume of attacks to target the servers, where as a single
censor can bring down a replica upon detecting the true location; it leads to
much more frequent migrations.
• The time overhead of the redirection operation associated with the migration
causes packet losses.
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• A large amount of spare cloud infrastructure capacity is needed to allow large
scale replication of servers.
Using out-of-band methods, such as email, can help get around the problem
with access to the load balancers. Dynamic group arrangements could be performed
each time new IP addresses are needed for replica servers to help alleviate the issue
of having some users constantly being blocked as a result of their grouping. The remaining three limitations, however, pose serious challenges in utilizing this approach.
We leveraged some of the insight gained in looking at these problems to design our
solution.
The second MTD scheme of interest is MT6D [28]. MT6D is a form of a dynamic, network layer MTD that rapidly changes IPv6 addresses of both the sender
and receiver mid-session without dropping or renegotiating sessions. The design takes
advantage of IPv6 for new address binding. MT6D creates dynamic Interface IDentifier (IID) obscuration to create dynamic IP addresses. These IIDs are comprised of
three parts: (1) a value specific to an individual host (seed IID), (2) a secret (symmetric) key shared between both parties, and (3) some changing value that is agreed
upon by both parties (e.g., time). Out-of-band is suggested for sharing of the seed
IID and the shared key. MT6D encapsulates each packet using Unreliable Datagram
Protocol (UDP) to hide the original IP addresses, and uses virtual IPs. Although
some initial steps have been taken to extend MT6D to support client-server based
networking, it was focused solely on peer-to-peer networks. The much more common
client-server networks are left untreated [37]. The limitations of MT6D are as follows:
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• Packet loss due to address collision. As the IP addresses of the hosts are dynamically changed, a host must check to see that the new IP address is free. If an
address collision occurs, the source and the destination will remain disconnected
during that rotation interval.
• The use of shared keys between server and all clients (out-of-band) has scalability implications.
• Relatively tight time synchronization is needed.
• Organization of users to virtual IPs of a server is the most limiting factor for
MT6D. It has two options for this allocation: (1) one virtual IP per each user,
which is not scalable, and (2) one virtual IP per each predefined group of users.
In the second option, the users that get grouped with a censor will be perpetually
blocked.

5.3

Using Mobile IPv6-based MTD for Anti-Censorship
In this section, we first describe our Mobile IPv6-based Moving Target Defense

(MI-MTD) scheme and present an analytical model to help reason about the various
factors that affect the effectiveness of the scheme. We then discuss a user registration
scheme, and present an optimization scheme that aids in improving the effectiveness
of our approach. Finally, we present our experimental results to demonstrate the
feasibility of using MI-MTD.
As described briefly above, the core of this approach involves the use of multiple
IPv6 CoAs. Unlike actual mobile applications, however, the host (web server) is
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treated as the mobile node: the HoA is used as the permanent address of the server
and the CoAs are used as the dynamic addresses. The CoAs are assigned to groups of
users called access groups. We generate pseudo-random IP addresses to dynamically
rotate all CoAs of the server after each time interval. During each shuffling interval,
each access group membership is randomly changed by shuffling and redistributing
the users. The binding update mechanism is used to update users with the new CoAs.
Note that HAs and real mobility are not needed in our scheme. We just need
to set the Mobile IPv6 parameters in the server and select an IP address for the
HoA with a prefix different from that of the server’s subnet. When Mobile IPv6 is
run, the server will receive the route advertisement message from its router, where
the prefix of the home link will be different from the prefix of the HoA. As such,
the server will think that it is in a foreign network and will register a CoA in this
network. To randomly generate the CoAs, 64 bit addresses are created at random
and combined with the home link prefix to generate the new CoAs. These new CoAs
are checked against existing occupancy via neighbor solicitation messages before they
are registered on the subnet. According to the multiple CoAs registration rules of
Mobile IPv6, the server (acting as if it were the MN) will send BU messages to its
users to inform them of the new CoAs. When each user receives the BU message,
the HoA and CoA of the server are inserted into the binding cache. The server also
removes the previous CoAs.
On the server-side some changes are needed to the implementation of Mobile
IPv6 to (1) allow the allocation of users to different access groups and (2) update
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each group by its allocated CoA. No changes are needed on the user side, and the
Mobile IPv6 protocol standard is also not changed.
Two components are critical to the scheme we described: the allocation and
shuffling of multiple CoAs. First, allocating different CoAs to each access group limits
the impact of having a censor (an adversary who may be pretending to be a normal
user) within a group. Once a censor discovers a CoA, it will utilize IP blocking to
cut-off access to the server that may occur via the CoA in question. All users that
are in the same access group as this censor would lose their connections to the server.
Second, to alleviate this problem, shuffling is used and each user is randomly rotated
through the different access groups during each shuffling interval. To eliminate packet
loss during address shuffling, we propose to have the server send a BU message for its
new CoAs before removing the previous CoAs. Therefore, during the handoff delay,
packets sent by users will have the old CoA in their header and will be received by the
server. Each of the previous CoAs can be removed by the server after receiving the
respective BAs from all users in each access group or after a certain amount of time.
In our analysis and initial test implementation, we used a static shuffling interval, but
it is possible to use a dynamic value. Dynamic intervals may be utilized to decrease
any potential overhead associated with the binding update mechanism, and is part
of our planned research.
The adversary may attempt to circumvent our scheme by blocking the entire
subnet for each of the servers. We envision a coalition amongst web content providers
and/or network domain operators, such that web server mirrors can be placed in
various subnets in conjunction with other unblocked content (that is desirable to the
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adversary). The drawback is that such cooperative agreement between independent
entities may not be possible. If cooperation can be achieved, this participation of the
friendly domain is relatively cheap compared to ISP participation in other methods
(e.g., decoy-routing): it does not require the friendly domain to perform any special
handling of the target servers’ traffic; they just need to allow placement of some
servers (that act as mirrors for the target website) in their subnet. There are several
interesting implications and potential solutions (such as compensation models), which
could be researched and modeled. We leave this for future work.
As discussed earlier, our goal is to show that it is technically feasible and
relatively low-cost to implement our scheme. At the same time, we will show that it
is prohibitively expensive for the adversary. The swarming ratio, derived in the next
section, helps us reason about these two issues.
5.3.1

Model and Analysis
In order to understand the efficacy of the MI-MTD scheme, we need to ana-

lyze the effects of having the adversary’s agents (hereinafter referred to as censors)
masquerading as normal end-users. Each censor will receive BU messages with a new
CoA after each shuffling interval; this CoA will then be blocked or attacked by the
adversary. During each interval, end-users that reside in an access group that contain
at least one censor (by random chance) would be blocked from accessing the server.
We are first interested in the probability of being blocked at at any given moment
based on the number of CoAs and the number of censors.
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Table 5.1: Summary of Notations
N
Na
Nu
I
Aj
Pj
Nub
Nuf
p
bk
t
φ

Total # of users (including censors)
# of adversary’s agents (censors)
# of (innocent) users
# of IPs (CoAs) used per interval
# of users assigned to IPj , j = 1 to I
Probability that IPj is not blocked
# of users grouped with censors
# of users in censor-less groups
(Instantaenous) Access probability
Blocking probability over k intervals
duration of one shuffling interval (time)
swarming ratio

A mathematical model of the shuffling process is used to help us reason about
the performance. The notations used in this model are summarized in Table 5.1.
The total number of users, N , is the sum of the number of censors (Na ) and
normal users(Nu ): N = Na + Nu . At each shuffling interval, the normal users can be
divided into two categories—those that are grouped with censors (Nub ) and those that
are not grouped with censors (Nuf ): Nu = Nub +Nuf . We compute access probability,
p, which is the probability that a user has access to the server at any given moment.
To compute p, we first need to compute the expected value of the number of users
assigned to groups without censors (Nuf ):

Nuf =

I
X
j=1
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Pj Aj

(5.1)

The probability that any given CoA, IPj , is not blocked is:

Pj =

!N −Na 
A

! Nj 

(5.2)

Aj

where

!N −Na 
Aj

is the number of ways that censors are not in group Aj and

!N 
Aj

is the

number of ways to select Aj users from the population of N . Therefore, we have:

E [Nuf ] =

I
X
j=1

!N −Na 
A

! Nj  Aj

(5.3)

Aj

We assume (1) equal-sized access groups, which means that the users are uniformly
distributed over the available CoAs, and (2) that N is divisible by I. Based on the
first assumption,
Aj = Ai = A, ∀i, j ∈ (1, I)

(5.4)

and bacause of the second assumption, we have,

A=

N
for all j.
I

(5.5)

Substituting Equation (5.4) into Equation (5.3) leads

E [Nuf ] = I × A ×
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!N −Na 

A
!N
 .
A

(5.6)

Since N = I × A (Equation (5.5)), we can show

E [Nuf ] = N ×

!N −Na 

A
!N
 .

(5.7)

A

Using an approach similar to [18], based on Stirling’s Approximation, n! ≈

! n n √
e

2πn,

and assuming Na ≪ N :

E [Nuf ] = N



N − Na
N

A

=N



Na
1−
N

N/I

(5.8)

Therefore, the ratio of users that have access, which represents the probability p with
which a user has access to the server at any given moment, is 1 :

N
p=
Nu



Na
1−
N

N/I

(5.9)

For example, if we have 1,000,000 users along with 5,000 censors, and 10,000
CoAs are used at each shuffling interval, the probability of having access to the server
during one shuffling interval for any given user is about 60.88%.
Given the probability of access for each interval, we can reason about other
important metrics based on practical considerations such as website access patterns
that occur in real-life. For example, a user accessing certain information on a website
does not typically interact with the web server in a constant/continuous manner.
Meaning, the user does not constantly click and load web pages (and related web
1

We empirically validated the result against the expanded form of Equation (5.3), and the differences were negligible.
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resources such as images). The pattern of access typically involves interaction with the
server (short duration) followed by actual reading of the information on the user’s own
machine (longer duration). As such, it is useful to investigate how much inconvenience
the user will experience in trying to get to the information. Due to our shuffling
methodology, the probability of access (at any given moment) is an independent
probability, which allows us to easily compute the blocking probability over a time
period δ. The time period δ is some multiple of the shuffling interval (t). Hence,
we derive the number of intervals in question, k = ⌈δ/t⌉, and denote the blocking
probability over this period as bk . We can compute k independent trials during which
the user is always grouped with a censor:

k

bk = (1 − p) , k =

lδ m
t

(5.10)

For example, we can look at a period of one minute and calculate the blocking
probability over that period. This measures the probability that the user is denied
access to the server for the entire period. For shuffling interval, t, of 10 seconds,
b6 = (1 − 0.6088)6 ≈ 0.358%. In other words, the user has ∼99.6% chance of getting
access (every minute).
The overall effect of having our solution in place depends on the relationship
between the key parameters. Primarily, we define the swarming ratio, φ, as ( NIa ).
The swarming ratio is a critical metric: it determines the access and blocking probabilities, and is not affected by the scale. In other words, changing the I and Na values
does not affect the access probability as long as the swarming ratio remains constant.
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Figure 5.2: Swarming ratio vs. blocking over δ.

Furthermore, changing Nu also does not affect the worst case access probability for
any given swarming ratio. It is trivial to see that if N is less than I, users are guaranteed access. As N increases, the access probability converges. For example, with
φ=0.5 from the previous example, the access probability, p, is never less than 60.65%.
Given a sufficiently large number of users, we can always compute the lower bound,
which is a function of the swarming ratio. Hence, the swarming ratio is a key metric
in our analysis.
Based on the equations introduced above, we also define what we term the
dominating point for the swarming ratio, which is where p becomes too low for the
system to be useful. What exactly is considered useful depends on the intended use
of the application. For instance, under extreme conditions, it may be good enough to
be able to access the website just once after several hours of attempts. In contrast,
typical web browsing for news articles may require some access every few minutes
or so. Hence, we must ask the following question: What kind of censorship is the
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adversary interested in? Is it interested in complete blockage, or is it just trying to
cause some level of inconvenience?
For illustration purposes, we choose 5% blocking over the period of one minute.
Let us say that the system will be considered useless if the user cannot access the
website with more than 95% probability after a minute of trying. In practice, it
would only be seen as a mere inconvenience or nuisance. Users, especially under
heavy censorship, will tolerate a much higher blocking rate. Also, as the period of
consideration increases from our one-minute example, the odds become better for
the user. We chose this scenario since it presents a more challenging case for our
approach. The goal of our proposed framework is to make censorship efforts much
more expensive for the adversary.
In the current working example, the dominating point occurs when φ=0.9339.
Figure 5.2 shows the effect of changing the swarming ratio. With this result, we can
explore the underlying problem space given IPv6 and the limitations of the hardware
resources available for a website. The total number of IP addresses a web-server can
utilize within a single subnet is 264 . The total number of CoAs a server can utilize
during each shuffling interval (within each subnet) depends on two limiting factors.
First, if all 264 IPs are used, then the server will exhaust all possible addresses within
one interval, and as a result, the access groups will not be able to receive new, neverbefore-assigned, CoAs.
However, it is unlikely that a server system will utilize all of the 264 IPs at the
same time as the number is simply too large given current technology. (We provide
a discussion of what is currently feasible with an example in the next section.) If
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100,000 CoAs are used in each interval, it would take more than 5.849×107 years
to exhaust all usable addresses. This figure represents the lifespan of the system.
Second, the creation and binding performance of the IPs to be used as CoAs at each
shuffling interval is limited by the hardware of the server and the router. Based on our
experiments (and what others have experimented with in the literature [37]), we used
the value I=10,000 for our example because working with 10,000 simultaneous IPs
did not incur large latencies. Given this value, to achieve a swarming ratio of 0.9339,
N a has to be 0.9339 × 10, 000 = 9, 339. The adversary must utilize 9,339 censors to
cause a mere 5% blocking over each minute of users’ access attempts. Using the same
parameters, for complete blockage (greater than 99%) over 10 hours (such to prevent
a user from downloading even a single news article over a period of 10 hours), the
adversary needs to achieve a swarming ratio of 12.8 by deploying 128,000 censors.
Using the 5-minute registration example from earlier, the adversary in this case needs
1,067 humans to complete the blocking process by the end of the 10-hour period,
meaning before the 10 hours is up, people have chance to access the website. To
achieve complete blockage for 10-hours, the adversary would need to setup 128,000
censors at the start of the period in question. If we give the adversary a one hour
window, 10,667 people are needed.
The process has to repeat when the server resets the users. Also, ramping
up the number of CoAs across all mirrors should be (1) relatively trivial in terms
of the man-power required, and (2) cost-efficient for the website operators. We aim
to demonstrate these ideas in this work. On the other hand, the cost for censoring
should quickly becomes unmanageable for the adversary. This cost should become
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even more unmanageable with a large number of websites that the adversary tries to
block. (Figure 5.2 illustrates the swarming ratio required for the adversary to achieve
different levels of blocking for three different intervals of user access attempts.)
This discussion outlines the cost struggle between the two competing sides.
The server must deploy a sufficiently large number of CoAs and the adversary must
deploy a sufficiently large number of censors, with each side fighting to control the
swarming ratio.

5.3.2

User Registration Procedure
In practice, the adversary does not need N a physical computers to create N a

censors. Similar to the server’s configuration, an adversary may create a system by
binding a large number of IP addresses, which in turn can be used as censors. According to the experimental results in [37], it is possible to have 55,000 IPv6 addresses
bound to a single computer in suitable time. The example IP binding capability of
10,000 per each shuffling interval of 10 seconds was obtained from the same results.
Their experiment was performed on a non-server-grade computer with Intel i7-4770
processor running at 3.4Ghz with 16GB of RAM and an Intel I217-LM Gigabit Ethernet network interface card. Using machines with similar computing power, the
adversary can theoretically implement 55,000 censors. As discussed earlier, to combat automated censor deployment, a method for requiring human response should be
utilized. For the end-user, this is not a problem since it only needs to be performed
at initial registration. Some of the suggested out-of-band methods include difficult
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CAPTCHA-like tests or mini games that require a non-trivial amount of time for a
human to solve.
The registration status should be reset at some time interval (e.g., every 12
hours), which forces the adversary to repeat the registration process for every single
censor. Another important factor in censor deployment is the use-duration of a censor. If a censor was deployed immediately after the new registration cycle opens, it is
potentially useful for the entire cycle. If a censor was deployed at the 11th hour, that
censor is only useful for the next hour, after which the registration would be reset
globally. Since humans cannot solve massive numbers of challenge tests in parallel
(without equally multiplying the time it takes to do them), the average use-duration
of a censor (if the adversary spends the entire cycle solving challenge questions without any breaks) would be half the cycle time. To cause a complete block over a 10
hour period, with a 12 hour registration cycle and a one-minute solving time for the
challenge tests, the adversary could prepare 128,000 censors during the first two hours
after registration resets. Then, during the next 10 hours, no user would be able to
access the server. For this scenario, the adversary needs 1,067 human agents to work
for the full two hours. On the server-side, we can relatively easily add additional
combinations of computers, network interfaces, and routers. In practice, web server
sites consist of many computers. To combat a 10 server site configuration each with
10 server-interfaces, the adversary needs 106,700 humans working in parallel. Furthermore, during the first two hours, a large number of users would still be able to
access the server.
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Because there are no HAs (by design), a new user will not be able to start a
connection to the server using the HoA of the server. Instead, the connection initiation
is made by the server upon receiving a request from a user. On the user side, the
host file needs to be set using the HoA and domain name of the server. To initiate
a connection from a new user to the server, the user must send its IP address and a
shared key to the server. One simple method is to utilize a secure email exchange for
this issue. However, some users may not have access to secure email exchange. For
example, users from certain countries may have access to Google’s search engine, but
cannot use Gmail. Therefore, other methods for registering new users are needed.

Figure 5.3: Sample user registration window on uncensored sites.

With the help of friendly web servers, we can address this issue as follows. In
this approach, the friendly websites can volunteer to add a small script to assist in the
key exchange / registration process. Figure 5.3 shows a mock-up of what would show
up in the friendly websites’ that are assisting with ”Internet Freedom.” A new user
will be required to solve a CAPTCHA and put his IPv6 address through the ”Internet
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Figure 5.4: Packet format before and after removing destination option header/type
2 routing header.
Freedom” window. The user then needs to create a key that will be used for starting
IKEv2, explained in the next subsection, and select one of the censored servers that
he or she wishes to connect to (in the example figure, Facebook and Youtube are
shown). The script will be designed to send a packet to the censored server. This
packet will contain the IPv6 and the key of the user. the censored server can then
use the standard Mobile IPv6 procedure to start the route optimization mechanism
and update the user with one of its active CoAs.
To determine whether the user is human or an automated bot a challenge
puzzle that requires significant human intervention (e.g., CAPTCHA test) is needed.
One suggestion that we have, as shown in Figure 5.3, is the use of the reCAPTCHA
that is available for free, has API support, and the test comprises of a simple click
on a checkbox. On suspicious clicks, it diverts to more traditional CAPTCHA tests.
To combat the adversary’s use of large-scale automated censor operation, we need a
method that makes it difficult for both a human and a computer to solve within a
certain time window. Utilizing only the reCAPTCHA test, one such solution can be
constructed. For example, we propose the use of a sequence of reCAPTCHAs with
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random down time, the time during which the user waits for the next reCAPTCHA
to come up, and a short time window to perform the reCAPTCHA once it actually
does come up. We can also use random screen location for each subsequent of reCAPTCHAs to prevent automatic clicking after the first human click. During this
process, users have to quite actively engage themselves with the registration ”puzzle”
in order to not miss the time window. Changing the number of reCAPTCHAs in
the sequence and the random down time can help adjust the time requirement for
registration. This registration process should be configured such that the users are
reset after a certain amount of time as explained previously. In this way, large-scale
automated censor operation requires significant human resources to operate. For example, with five minutes spent per registration, a human working non-stop for 24
hours straight can only manage up to 288 censors. Our discussion of the numbers
holds here as well. We later describe a novel approach to further shift the ratio in
the server’s favor, aiding in both the strength and the scalability of our framework.

5.3.3

IPsec with IKEv2
When a node (N1) wants to send a data packet to another node (N2), it will

have already supplied the HoAs as the source and destination addresses in the packet
header. Next, N1 checks the binding update list to see if it has already sent a BU
message to N2, and search for the CoA from N2’s entry. If it is found, N1 includes its
CoA in the home address option. N1 then checks its Binding Cache to see if N2 has
sent a BU message to N1. If it is found, N1 constructs a type 2 routing header and
places the N2’s CoA inside it. The packet with HoAs in the source and destination
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addresses of the header will reach IPsec. After encrypting and adding headers, the
home address option is swapped with the source address and the type 2 routing header
is swapped with the destination address of the packet header. When the packet is
received by N2, the headers are processed in the order they appear in the packet, and
the IPsec implementation always sees HoAs in the source and destination addresses of
the packet header [46, p. 116-119]. IPsec does not encrypt the type 2 routing header
and the home address option that show HoA of the source and destination.
To prevent any censoring we can resolve this problem by removing the destination option header (and the type 2 routing header) from all packets. Note that
the Security Parameter Index (SPI) found in the IP Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP) header is sufficient to get access to the HoA (the real source/destination of the
packet). The packet format before and after removing destination option header/the
type 2 routing header are shown in Figure 5.4.
We also propose the use of standard key management techniques. IKEv2 can
be used to increase the security and scalability, and prevent replay attacks. To start
IKEv2, some negotiations need to be performed between peers, and then SPIs will
be defined (a total of four messages). After those steps, we can remove the HoA
and use SPIs. The friendly server, the uncensored server used for user registration,
needs to encapsulate the first packet of IKEv2 between a user and the server. Note
that the key the user needs to put in the Internet Freedom window is to be used for
IKE AUTH Exchange, which is the first step for IKEv2. The details are out of the
scope of this work, and can be found in the standards document for IKEv2.
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5.3.4

Optimization: Behavior Monitoring and Credit Based Accounting
Method
In this section, we introduce a novel approach to address the scalability issue

mentioned above. We reduce the number of CoAs and utilize dynamic shuffling
interval(s). Behavior monitoring is also performed, where we organize the users and
group them according to the country that they belong to. This information can be
obtained via the IPv6 prefix. The server can then check the status of one of its
CoAs by sending ping commands to a pre-established point of contact (or to some
webservers) in the same country that the users of the particular CoA group belong
to. If a response is not received, the IP is blocked by a censor.
Instead of competing only through the strength of the computer/network system to create and operate with a large number of CoAs, we dynamically shift group
membership based on a notion of credit assigned to each user. Basically, the credit
value represents the amount of ”trust” the system can place in a user.
By default, the credit (C) for each new user starts at zero. After each shuffling
interval, the server checks each of its CoAs to see if they are blocked. If a CoA is
not blocked, C is increased for each user in the group associated with the CoA.
The amount by which C is increased is based on the number of users in the group
(Cnew = Cold + (G − 1)).
We utilize C to combine groups together, which results in the creation of a
larger group. When we combine groups, we are assuming that the group members
are innocent users. Another change from the basic framework is that the server no
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Table 5.2: Credit Based Method Notations
C
G
Gmin
Gmax
R(G)

Credit for each user
Group size
Minimum group size
Maximum group size
Risk of group G

longer shuffles groups whose IP addresses are not blocked. The server can maintain
a lookup table with two columns—group size (G) and the risk of each group (R(G)).
New users with zero credit are assigned to small size groups with size Gmin , and the
risk for these smallest groups is zero. At each shuffling interval any (larger) group
that is blocked is divided into two groups. This process is continued, and could go
on until reaching the minimum group size for some groups.
The risk of a group is defined as the maximum cost of having a censor in
this group. For example, assume that Gmin = 2 and we have a group of eight users
consisting of seven innocent users and one censor. Assume that the censor waited a
while and starts to block (at which point the group size has reached eight). The censor
will block seven innocent users (8−1) for one shuffling interval. After the server splits
the group, the censor will be assigned to one of the two groups of four users, at which
point it can block three innocent users. In the next shuffling interval, the group with
the censor inside will reach the minimum size, with one innocent victim. Therefore
the cost of having a censor in a group of eight users is (7 + 3 + 1 = 11). This cost is
used as the risk of groups. The notations are summarized in Table 5.2. With some
calculations we can obtain that if the size of a group (G) is Gmin × 2j , the risk of this
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Figure 5.5: Credit based method example.

group is:
R(G) =

j−1 
X
G
i=0

2i

−1



(5.11)

Note that the size of the lookup table the server has to maintain is relatively
small. For example, if Gmin = 100 and the maximum group size (Gmax ) equals
1,638,400 then the number of rows in the table is equal to log2

! 1638400 
100

= 14 that is

small enough for quick search to find suitable group for a user with a specific credit
value.
A censor may pretend to be an innocent user in order to get into a bigger
group before starting to block. To make it expensive for censors to wait, a user is
added to a group only if the user’s credit is twice the risk of the group. When the
server detects that the IP address of a group is blocked and divides the group as
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Figure 5.6: The network topology of the testbed.

described above, the credit for each user is decreased by 2 × (G − 1). Note that the
credit starts from zero and increases until twice Gmax .
In the example shown in Figure 5.5, we have one censor (whose credit value is
circled and highlighted in red, bold/italic font) that is waiting to be in a large group.
First the server generates eight CoAs for the groups. Note the server does not need
to create new IPs when it is merging two groups. Assume the censor starts blocking
when it is in a group of eight users (line 6 in the example). At this point, the server
will create two IPs and divide the group in question into two groups and continue
this process until finding the censor.
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5.3.5

Prototype Implementation
A proof of concept prototype of the first version of our method was imple-

mented to illustrate the validity of the basic mechanics of the approach and to evaluate the performance of the design. To implement our method, we used an IPv6
testbed configured as shown in Figure 5.6. We used three routers (R1, R2, and R3)
and five computers (2.4GHz Intel Core 2 Duo CPU with 4GB DDR2 800MHz RAM)
running Ubuntu 14.04. Linux kernel (version 3.8.2) with the mobility options enabled was compiled and installed on the computers. An open source implementation
of Mobile IPv6 (UMIP) for Linux was used. Router R1 is used to emulate the heart
of the Internet. Packet forwarding is enabled on the censor to work like a router. In
this first version we used one CoA for the single access group of users (user1, user2,
and user3). In this setup, the censor is not in the group.
After preparing the UMIP configuration files (mip6d.conf) to setup parameters
such as IPsec (with static keys between the server and the users) and acceptance of
route optimization, for the server and the users, the mobility daemons were run.
Note that the server’s HoA does not have the same prefix with the advertised prefix
of R2. The server registered a CoA on R2 and updated all users with its CoA. We
used a program to create a new CoA every 10 seconds (and remove the previous
one). According to the Mobile IPv6, the server sends the BU message to its users to
inform them of its new CoA. The ACK bit of BU messages forces users to send back
acknowledgment messages in response to BU messages. This process ensures that
the users receive the BU messages and update their binding cache entries. Therefore,
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Figure 5.7: The Binding Update process.

in every 10-second interval, we have two overhead packets between the server and
each user as shown in Figure 5.7. Normally, during this update procedure, the users
are unable to access the server until they receive the BU messages. We resolved this
problem by using the multiple CoA registration on the server. That is, the CoA of
one interval is kept alive until the next CoA has been received by all users. It is
removed once all users are rotated on to the new CoA, and the process repeats.
There are two types of overheads of the proposed method—overhead caused by
the updating procedure because of the BU and BA messages (signaling overhead) and
overhead in each data packet transmission between the server and a user (transmission
overhead):
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• Signaling overhead: A complete correspondent node registration needs two message transmissions at the server (BU and BA messages) with each being 110
bytes (using IPsec and removing destination option and the type 2 routing
headers). Note that in the original Mobile IPv6, the length of each BU and BA
is 110 bytes, and because of using return routability mechanism, we have four
extra messages. Therefore, the overhead of route optimization in our method is
only about one-third of the original Mobile IPv6. Also, to minimize the number
of messages generated and reduce the overhead, it is possible to operate the system without using BAs. If data is received from the client to the new CoA, the
server knows the client received the BU without needing an explicit BA. Since
the standard protocol already has a flag that lets the other side know whether
or not to return a BA, no modifications are needed to utilize this method.
• Transmission overhead: For each data packet, we have 24 bytes of overhead due
to the use of IPsec (ESP). Note that without using our method we still need
to use IPsec to have secure connection between the server and users so the real
overhead caused by our method per each data packet is zero.

5.4

Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we presented an anti-censorship framework using moving tar-

get defense designed with Mobile IPv6. Our analysis showed, based on an important metric called swarming ratio, that it is possible to use our scheme to aid in
making it difficult or impractical for the adversary to deploy censorship techniques.
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Our approach to shuffling optimization with a novel user grouping strategy further
strengthens our framework. The solution leverages the standard Mobile IPv6 protocol and does not require changes in the network protocol nor use third party network
elements. We also demonstrated the feasibility of deployment with a lab-based tests
of Mobile IPv6 protocol with the home agent completely removed from the update
process.
We are currently experimenting with various optimizations, such as the use of
multicasting, on the server implementation to further minimize overhead and improve
performance. To this end, our future experiments will include large-scale testing with
multiple interfaces. We believe that the anti-censorship measure would be extremely
robust if our scheme is used in conjunction with other anti-censorship methodologies.
Specifically, since our approach is host-side, it lends itself well to a combination with
end-user or end-to-middle schemes. With participation and support from friendly
websites across the globe, we feel that our framework can add tremendous strength
to the effort of making the Internet accessible for all.
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CHAPTER 6

SIMULATIONS

NS-3, a discrete-event network simulator, is primarily used for research and
education. NS-3 is free software that publicly available for development, research, and
use. Developing an open simulation environment is the main goal of NS-3 project.
Building a well-documented and easy to use and debug solid simulation core is other
goals on NS-3 project. Furthermore, both IP and non-IP based networks are supported by the NS-3 simulation core.
NS-3 also supports simulation-in-the-loop that is a real-time scheduler for interacting with real computers. For example, users can send and receive packet generated by NS-3 on real network devices. NS-3 can also be used as an interconnection
framework between virtual machines. Another advantage of NS-3 is the possibility of
reusing real applications and kernel codes. This important advantage is provided by
Direct Code Execution (DCE) module of NS-3 [61].
DCE provides a method to execute existing implementations of kernel space
and user space applications and network protocols within NS-3 without any change
in their source codes. For example, the standard ping application can be used instead
of its pseudo application in NS-3 (e.g., V4PingHelper). Note that the source code of
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Figure 6.1: Architecture of Direct Code Execution [1].

applications need to be recompiled to run by DCE. DCE is the first free and open
source framework that integrates both Linux kernel space protocol stack and Portable
Operating System Interface (POSIX) socket based protocol implementations. POSIX
includes standards for maintaining compatibility between different operating systems.
POSIX provides software compatibility through the use of Application Programming
Interface (API) for socket based user space application codes. DCE includes three
main parts (illustrated in Figure 6.1):
• Core: Core module handles global memory, visualization of stacks, and heaps.
It isolates the namespace of each simulated process through the use of single
process module visualization.
• Kernel layer: this layer provides an execution environment for the Linux network
stack based on the core services.
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• POSIX layer: This layer re-implement the standard socket APIs. The POSIX
layer is built upon the core and kernel layer.
DCE supports different features such as simulation with POSIX socket application, C/C++ application, IPv4/IPv6, and TCP/UDP/DCCP. DCE also support
a range of existing applications like CCNx, Quagga, iperf, ping/ping6, ip (iproute2
package), Mobile IPv6 daemon (UMIP), Linux kernel (from 2.6.36 to 3.7 versions),
http server (thttpd), and torrent. DCE only supports Linux-based operating systems.
DCE is tested on these distributions:
• Ubuntu: 10.04 64-bit, 12.04 32-bit/64-bit, 12.10 64-bit, 13.04 64-bit, 13.10 64bit, 14.04 64-bit.
• Fedora: 18 32-bit.
• CentOS: 6.2 64-bit.
DCE can be installed in two major modes, basic and advance. In the basic mode,
DCE uses the NS-3 TCP stacks but in the advance mode DCE uses a Linux network
stack. The installation process is explained in Appendix B.
For the simulation tests, DCE is installed in the advance mode on a computer
running Ubuntu 14.04 64-bit. The computer contains Intel i7-4790 (3.6GHz - 8 cores)
CPU with 16GB DDR3 RAM. The edited version of UMIP for MTM6D is used on
simulations. The network topology of the simulations is illustrated in Figure 6.2.
Router R1 is used as the heart of the Internet. Router R0 is connected to R1 and a
computer. The computer (our server) acts like an MN of Mobile IPv6. The prefix of
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Figure 6.2: The network topology of the simulations.

the MN’s HoA is different from the prefix received by route advertisement messages
of R0. So, the MN sees itself sitting in a foregin network and subsequently registers
a CoA in this network. Routers R2 to R27 are connected to R1. Each of them
is connected to 20 CNs (clients). The MTM6D method with 10 seconds shuffling
interval is implemented on the MN. In this way, the MN sends 500 BU packets to the
CNs after each 10 seconds. The CNs also replays to the BU messages by sending BA
packets.
For the scalability test, we used iperf [62] to generate TCP and UDP packets.
Iperf is a network testing tool that can generate TCP and UDP data streams to
measure the bandwidth and quality of a network. Iperf, written in C programming
language, is commonly used for network performance measurement.
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6.1

UDP Test
We utilized all 500 clients from our setup to send UDP packets to the server.

For this goal, Iperf is implemented on each CN to send multiple number of packets
per second during 100 seconds to the server. On the server side, 500 Iperf processes
are implemented that each one is listening to one port (one port per each client). The
size of each UDP packet is equal to 1470 bytes. In fact, during the last test (with 500
packets per second), the server receives 2.94 Gbits/sec data (500 × 500 × 1470 × 8).
The server also sends 500 BU packets per each 10 seconds. The simulation scenario
for this test is shown in Appendix C.
The round trip time between each client and the server was set to 30ms.
Therefore, the amount of time that it takes for the CoA update is 30ms. As we set
the shuffling interval to 10 seconds , the handoff delay ratio equals,

(0.030/10) = 0.3%.

(6.1)

The packets that are lost include those that were generated between the window of
15ms prior to the issuing of the BU in question and 15ms thereafter.
creftable:sim shows the simulation results of packet lost ratio for two scenarios:
(1) with MTM6D and (2) without MTM6D. The MTM6D packet loss ratio shown in
the table is very close to the ratio obtained by Equation (6.1).
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Table 6.1: Packet loss rates (UDP test)
Number of packets
per second
100
200
300
400
500
6.2

Packet Loss Rate
With MTM6D Without MTM6D
0.32%
0.00%
0.34%
0.01%
0.31%
0.00%
0.32%
0.00%
0.29%
0.00%

TCP Test
Some simulations also performed to test the effect of the handoff delay while

using TCP. For this test 25 clients (one per each subnet) generate and send TCP
packets to the server. The packets that are lost during the handoff are retransmitted;
with TCP, these lost packets do not generate ACK packets, which results in retransmission. We configured Iperf in TCP mode on the clients for 50 seconds. Each client
connects to a port of the server and Iperf utility provided the throughput statistics
of each connections. In fact, Iperf implementation increased the number of sent TCP
packets to test the bandwidth of each connections.
During the handoff delay, TCP experiences timeout, resends the unacknowledged packet(s) and goes to slow start. This phenomenon is shown in our test results
(Figure 6.3a). The graph shows the handoff delay effect for 10 second shuffling intervals. We also did the same test without implementing MTM6D. The results of this
test is shown in Figure 6.3b. The average transferred data per each client (Transfer)
and the average of bandwidth per each client (Bandwidth) is shown in Table 6.2. This
table also shows the comparison between two scenarios (with and without MTM6D).
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Table 6.2: The average transferred data and bandwidth per each client during the
TCP test.

Without MTM6D
With MTM6D

Transfer
(MBytes)
63
58

Bandwidth
(Mbits/sec)
10.4
9.54

As shown in the table, using MTM6D decreases the bandwidth with 8.27% because
of two reasons:
• The slow start feature of TCP during handoff delay.
• The overhead caused by BU and BA packets.

6.3

Future Plan
During the simulation tests only MTM6D was implemented. Other methods

like MVPN and MTM6D II need to be tested. Also more number of clients should
be used for both UDP and TCP test. Implementing multiple CoAs registration for
MTM6D can prevent packet loss on UDP test and slow start on TCP test. However,
we will still have some decrease in the bandwidth because of the overhead of BU and
BA packets.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.3: Number of TCP packets delivered over time. (a) With MTM6D. (b)
Without MTM6D.
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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Remote cyber attacks can be started from unlimited distance. These remote
attacks include special actions which allow attackers to compromise remote systems.
During the first step of attacks, reconnaissance step, attackers attempt to gather
information about their intended target(s). For network-based systems, figuring out
the IP address(es) of the target(s) is critical to the success of the attack. There
are several countermeasures to protect systems from these attacks such as firewalls
and Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS). Unfortunately, zero-day
exploits can defeat the best firewalls and IDPSs. Regardless of the strength of these
countermeasures used in practice, the use of static IP addresses leaves the target
vulnerable in two ways. First, they are discoverable. Second, after accessing the
target, the attacker can maintain this access for a long time. An effective defense is
a mechanism to change the IP addresses randomly and dynamically.
In this dissertation, an MTD method based on Mobile IPv6 (MTM6D) is
proposed to improve the security of Critical Infrastructure Networks. MTM6D dynamically changes the IP address of a server to make it difficult for an attacker to find
the server. A hybrid scheme (MVPN) is also proposed to establish a framework for
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supporting secure VPNs. Another proposed method is a lossless method for IP-based
control (MTM6D II) that can prevent black hole attacks and bandwidth depletion
DDoS attacks. This MTD method can also be used as an anticensorship method to
make it difficult or impractical for an adversary to deploy censorship techniques.
Preventing remote attacks against the Internet services, e.g., Secure Shell
(SSH), is a part of future work. A server with an enabled remote access service such as
SSH is a good target for attackers. Adding an extra layer of security for SSH servers
should be investigated. Indeed, changing the SSH server’s IP address randomly and
dynamically can prevent address-based DDoS attacks and remote exploits. Assume
that we have a server with Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) and SSH
services. The ideal solution is using IP address hopping on the server. In this way,
attackers cannot find the IP address of the server. However, new users should be able
to start new connections with the server. Therefore, two servers should be used: (1)
web server with a static IP address that should be accessible by all users through the
Internet and (2) SSH server with dynamic IP addresses that should only be accessible by authorized users. Although the web server is accessible by attackers, with this
method the attack surface of our system is minimized because the SSH server cannot
be found by attackers through IP address scanning. The communication process for
a new user is shown in Figure 7.1.
Another part of future work is adopting the presented MTD method to implement dynamic IP addresses on all clients in client-server communications. We
are currently experimenting with various optimizations, such as the use of multicasting, on the server implementation to further minimize overhead and improve
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Figure 7.1: Communication process for a new user.

performance. Although the first simulation tests are performed to check the scalability of our method, new simulation tests with more number of nodes remain to be
investigated.
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APPENDIX A

IP ADDRESS ROTATOR SCRIPT FOR MTM6D

1

#! / b i n / bash

2

a r r a y =( 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 a b c d e

3

n e t w o r k =2001: db8 : f f f f : 1 # n e t w o r k

4

o l d i p=$1 # c u r r e n t IP o f

5

gen ( )

6

{

f

)

prefix

the system

7

a=$ { a r r a y [$RANDOM%16]} $ { a r r a y [$RANDOM%16]} $ { a r r a y [$RANDOM%16]} $ { a r r a y [$RANDOM%16]}

8

b=$ { a r r a y [$RANDOM%16]} $ { a r r a y [$RANDOM%16]} $ { a r r a y [$RANDOM%16]} $ { a r r a y [$RANDOM%16]}

9

c=$ { a r r a y [$RANDOM%16]} $ { a r r a y [$RANDOM%16]} $ { a r r a y [$RANDOM%16]} $ { a r r a y [$RANDOM%16]}

10

d=$ { a r r a y [$RANDOM%16]} $ { a r r a y [$RANDOM%16]} $ { a r r a y [$RANDOM%16]} $ { a r r a y [$RANDOM%16]}

11

i p=$ n e t w o r k : $a : $b : $ c : $d

12

n d i s c 6 −1 −w 100 −r 1 $ i p e t h 0 # Check new IP w i t h N e i g h b o r

13
14

i=$ ? # N e i g h b o r A d v e r t i s e m e n t

received

( 0 ) not

received

15

rotate

16

{

()

17

gen # G e n e r a t e new IP

18

while

19

do

20

[

$ i != 2 ]

gen # T h i s IP

is

not

free

so

r e g e n e r a t e a new random IP

21

done

22

/ s b i n / i p −6 addr add $ i p /64 dev e t h 0 # Add new IP

23

e c h o ”New IP : ” $ i p # For debug

24

s l e e p 2 # Wait f o r

25

/ s b i n / i p −6 addr d e l

26

e c h o ” Old IP : ” $ o l d i p # For debug

27

o l d i p=$ i p

28

s l e e p 8 # Rotation

29

}

30

while

31

do

32
33

(2)

}

r e g i s t e r i n g new IP b e f o r e

r e m o v i n g o l d IP

$ o l d i p /64 dev e t h 0 # Remove o l d IP

interval

e q u a l s 10 s ( 2 s + 8 s )

true ;

rotate
done
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APPENDIX B

BUILDING NS3 DCE ADVANCED MODE (WITH LINUX KERNEL)

1

sudo apt−g e t u p d a t e

2

sudo apt−g e t

3

hg c l o n e

install

g i t −c o r e

4

e x p o r t BAKE HOME=‘pwd ‘ / bake

5

e x p o r t PATH=$PATH : $BAKE HOME

mercurial

h t t p : / / c o d e . nsnam . o r g / bake bake

6

e x p o r t PYTHONPATH=$PYTHONPATH: $BAKE HOME

7

mkdir d c e

8

cd d c e

9

sudo apt−g e t

install

l i b d b −dev l i b e x p a t 1 −dev l i b p c a p −dev

l i b s s l −dev

֒→ p y g o o c a n v a s python−p y g r a p h v i z python−dev l i b q t 4 −dev b i s o n
֒→ s e t u p t o o l s

a u t o t o o l s −dev python−a l l −dev // pygccxml

10

bake . py c o n f i g u r e −e dce−ns3 −1.9 −e dce−quagga −1.9

11

bake . py download

12

bake . py b u i l d

13

sudo apt−g e t

14

bake . py c o n f i g u r e −e dce−l i n u x −1.9 −e dce−umip −1.9

install

a u t o c o n f automake b i s o n

15

bake . py download

16

bake . py b u i l d

17

cd s o u r c e / ns−3−d c e

18

. / t e s t . py −s dce−umip // For

. / waf −−run dce−umip−cmip6 // For

20

sudo apt−g e t

21

hg c l o n e

l i b s s l −dev i n d e n t

// Needed t o

h t t p : / / c o d e . nsnam . o r g / netanim

22

cd netanim /
qmake−q t 4 NetAnim . p r o

24

make

i p s e c −t o o l s

radvd

test

m e r c u r i a l qt4−dev−t o o l s

֒→ b a s e d on t h e Qt t o o l k i t

23

f l e x g++ gawk i n d e n t python−

n o t mandatory

test

19

install

flex

is

l i b s y s f s −dev python−
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install

Netanim an

offline

animator

APPENDIX C

SIMULATION SCENARIO FOR UDP TEST

1
2

#i n c l u d e ” n s 3 / network−module . h”

3

#i n c l u d e ” n s 3 / c o r e −module . h”

4

#i n c l u d e ” n s 3 / dce−module . h”

5

#i n c l u d e ” n s 3 / mip6d−h e l p e r . h”

6

#i n c l u d e ” n s 3 / csma−h e l p e r . h”

7

#i n c l u d e ” n s 3 / w i f i −h e l p e r . h”

8

#i n c l u d e ” n s 3 / yans−w i f i −h e l p e r . h”

9

#i n c l u d e ” n s 3 / nqos−w i f i −mac−h e l p e r . h”

10

#i n c l u d e ” n s 3 / m o b i l i t y −module . h”

11

#i n c l u d e ” n s 3 / p i n g 6−h e l p e r . h”

12

#i n c l u d e ” n s 3 / quagga−h e l p e r . h”

13

#i n c l u d e ” n s 3 / netanim−module . h”

14

#i n c l u d e ” n s 3 / p o i n t −to−p o i n t −module . h”

15
16

u s i n g namespace n s 3 ;

17

static

18

{

v o i d RunIp ( Ptr<Node> node , Time at ,

19

DceApplicationHelper

20

A p p l i c a t i o n C o n t a i n e r apps ;

21

process . SetBinary ( ” ip ” ) ;

22

process . SetStackSize

23

p r o c e s s . ResetArguments

24

p r o c e s s . ParseArguments ( s t r . c s t r

25

apps = p r o c e s s . I n s t a l l

26

apps . S t a r t

27

}

28

static

29

{

30

str )

process ;

( 1 << 1 6 ) ;
() ;
() ) ;

( node ) ;

( at ) ;

v o i d AddAddress ( Ptr<Node> node , Time at ,

std : : ostringstream

31

o s s << ”−f

32

RunIp ( node ,

33

std : : s t r i n g

const

c h a r ∗name ,

oss ;

i n e t 6 addr add ” << a d d r e s s << ” dev ” << name ;
at ,

oss . str

() ) ;

}
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const

char ∗ address )

34

bool usePing = true ;

35

i n t numN = 2 0 ; //Number o f CNs i n e a c h s u b n e t

36

i n t numR = 2 5 ; //Number o f

37

i n t main ( i n t

38

{

argc ,

subnets

char ∗ argv [ ] )

39

CommandLine cmd ;

40

cmd . AddValue ( ” u s e P i n g ” , ” U s i n g P in g 6 o r n o t ” , u s e P i n g ) ;

41

cmd . P a r s e ( a r g c ,

42

N o d e C o n t a i n e r mn,

43

mn . C r e a t e

44

r . C r e a t e (2+numR) ;

argv ) ;
r,

cn ;

(1) ;

45

cn . C r e a t e (numR∗numN) ;

46

PointToPointHelper pointToPoint ;

47

pointToPoint . SetDeviceAttribute

48

p o i n t T o P o i n t . S e t C h a n n e l A t t r i b u t e ( ” D e l ay ” ,

49

NetDeviceContainer

50

for

51

{

52

( int

( ” DataRate ” ,

StringValue

StringValue

d e v i c e s = pointToPoint . I n s t a l l

( ” 1 0 0 0 0 Mbps” ) ) ;

( ” 5ms” ) ) ;

( N o d e C o n t a i n e r ( r . Get ( 0 ) , r . Get ( 1 ) ) ) ;

i =0; i <numR ; i ++)

NetDeviceContainer

53

}

54

NetDeviceContainer

d e v i c e s 2 = pointToPoint . I n s t a l l

d e v i c e s 3 = pointToPoint . I n s t a l l

( N o d e C o n t a i n e r ( r . Get ( 1 ) , r . Get ( i +2) ) ) ;

( N o d e C o n t a i n e r ( r . Get ( 0 ) , mn) ) ;

55

CsmaHelper csma ;

56

csma . S e t C h a n n e l A t t r i b u t e ( ” DataRate ” ,

57

csma . S e t C h a n n e l A t t r i b u t e ( ” D el a y ” , TimeValue ( NanoSeconds ( 6 5 6 0 ) ) ) ;

58

N o d e C o n t a i n e r CNs [ numR ] ;

59

N e t D e v i c e C o n t a i n e r c s m a D e v i c e s [ numR ] ;

60

for

61

{

62

( int

StringValue

( ” 1000Mbps” ) ) ;

j =0; j <numR ; j ++)

CNs [ j ] . Add ( r . Get ( j +2) ) ;

63

for

64

{

65

( int

i =0; i <numN ; i ++)

CNs [ j ] . Add ( cn . Get ( ( j ∗numN)+i ) ) ;

66

}

67

c s m a D e v i c e s [ j ] = csma . I n s t a l l

68

}

( CNs [ j ] ) ;

69

DceManagerHelper dceMng ;

70

DceAp pl icati on Help er dce ;

71

dceMng . S e t T a s k M a n a g e r A t t r i b u t e ( ” FiberManagerType ” , EnumValue ( 0 ) ) ;

72

dceMng . S e t N e t w o r k S t a c k ( ” n s 3 : : L i n u x S o c k e t F d F a c t o r y ” , ” L i b r a r y ” ,

73

dceMng . I n s t a l l

(mn) ;

74

dceMng . I n s t a l l

(r);

75

dceMng . I n s t a l l

( cn ) ;

76

// P r e f i x

77

std : : s t r i n g

StringValue

configuration
ha sim0 ( ” 2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : 0 : : 1 0 0 0 / 6 4 ” ) ;

78

// For R0 ( Connected t o MN)

79

AddAddress ( r . Get ( 0 ) , S e c o n d s

( 0 . 1 ) , ” sim0 ” , ” 2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : 2 : : 1 / 6 4 ” ) ;
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( ” l i b l i n u x . so ” ) ) ;

80

AddAddress ( r . Get ( 0 ) , S e c o n d s

( 0 . 1 ) , ” sim1 ” , ” 2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : 1 : : 1 / 6 4 ” ) ;

81

RunIp ( r . Get ( 0 ) , S e c o n d s

(0.11) , ” link

set

l o up ” ) ;

82

RunIp ( r . Get ( 0 ) , S e c o n d s

(0.11) , ” link

set

sim0 up ” ) ;

83

RunIp ( r . Get ( 0 ) , S e c o n d s

(0.13) , ” link

set

sim1 up ” ) ;

84

RunIp ( r . Get ( 0 ) , S e c o n d s

( 1 . 1 5 ) , ”−6 r o u t e add d e f a u l t
( 0 . 1 5 ) , ” r o u t e show t a b l e

via

2001:9:9:2::2

dev sim0 ” ) ;

85

RunIp ( r . Get ( 0 ) , S e c o n d s

86

Ptr<L i n u x S o c k e t F d F a c t o r y > k e r n = r . Get ( 0 )−>GetObject<L i n u x S o c k e t F d F a c t o r y >() ;

87

S i m u l a t o r : : S c h e d u l e W i t h C o n t e x t ( r . Get ( 0 )−>GetId ( ) , S e c o n d s
֒→ L i n u x S o c k e t F d F a c t o r y : : S et ,

88

// For R1 ( I n t e r n e t )

89

AddAddress ( r . Get ( 1 ) , S e c o n d s

90

for

91

{

( int

( 0 . 1 ) , ” sim0 ” , ” 2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : 2 : : 2 / 6 4 ” ) ; // R1 t o R0

i =2; i <numR+2; i ++)

c h a r sim [ 7 ] ;

93

s p r i n t f ( sim , ” sim%d” , i −1) ; // One new sim p e r e a c h

94

c h a r IP [ 2 0 ] ;

95

s p r i n t f ( IP , ” 2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : 2 : : % d /64 ” ,

97

AddAddress ( r . Get ( 1 ) , S e c o n d s

i +1) ;

// e . g .

router

sim1

is

( R2 t o

...)

c o n n e c t e d t o R2 . IP o f sim1

is

2::3

( 0 . 1 ) , sim , IP ) ;

}

98

RunIp ( r . Get ( 1 ) , S e c o n d s

(0.11) , ” link

set

l o up ” ) ;

99

RunIp ( r . Get ( 1 ) , S e c o n d s

(0.11) , ” link

set

sim0 up ” ) ;

100

for

101

{

( int

i =2; i <numR+2; i ++)

102

char

103

s p r i n t f ( link , ” link

104

link [20];
s e t sim%d up ” , i −1) ;

RunIp ( r . Get ( 1 ) , S e c o n d s

105

}

106

RunIp ( r . Get ( 1 ) , S e c o n d s

(0.13) ,

107

for

108

{

( int

link ) ;

( 0 . 1 5 ) , ”−6 r o u t e add 2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : 1 : : / 6 4

֒→ P a c k e t s w i t h a CoA on t h e i r

destination

via

2001:9:9:2::1

dev sim0 ” ) ; //

s h o u l d be f o r w a r d e d t o R0

i =2; i <numR+2; i ++)

109

char

110

// Manual r o u t e s

route [ 6 0 ] ;
f o r CNs a s

destinations

of

packets

111

s p r i n t f ( r o u t e , ”−6 r o u t e add 2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : % d : : / 6 4

112

RunIp ( r . Get ( 1 ) , S e c o n d s

(0.15) ,

via

2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : 2 : : % d dev sim%d” ,

}

114

RunIp ( r . Get ( 1 ) , S e c o n d s

115

k e r n = r . Get ( 1 )−>GetObject<L i n u x S o c k e t F d F a c t o r y >() ;

116

S i m u l a t o r : : S c h e d u l e W i t h C o n t e x t ( r . Get ( 1 )−>GetId ( ) , S e c o n d s

( 0 . 1 5 ) , ” r o u t e show t a b l e

֒→ L i n u x S o c k e t F d F a c t o r y : : S et ,
117

// For Ri ( Connected t o CNs )

118

for

119

{

( int

i +1 , i +3 , i −1) ;

route ) ;

113

120

( 0 . 1 ) , MakeEvent (&

kern , ” . n e t . i p v 6 . c o n f . a l l . f o r w a r d i n g ” , ” 1 ” ) ) ;

92

96

all ”) ;

all ”) ;

( 0 . 1 ) , MakeEvent (&

kern , ” . n e t . i p v 6 . c o n f . a l l . f o r w a r d i n g ” , ” 1 ” ) ) ;

i =2; i <numR+2; i ++)

c h a r IP1 [ 2 0 ] ;

121

s p r i n t f ( IP1 , ” 2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : 2 : : % d /64 ” , numR+i +1) ;

122

c h a r IP2 [ 2 0 ] ;
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123

s p r i n t f ( IP2 , ” 2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : % d : : 1 / 6 4 ” ,

i +1) ;

124

AddAddress ( r . Get ( i ) , S e c o n d s

( 0 . 1 ) , ” sim0 ” , IP1 ) ;

125

AddAddress ( r . Get ( i ) , S e c o n d s

( 0 . 1 ) , ” sim1 ” , IP2 ) ;

126

RunIp ( r . Get ( i ) , S e c o n d s

(0.11) , ” link

set

l o up ” ) ;

127

RunIp ( r . Get ( i ) , S e c o n d s

(0.11) , ” link

set

sim0 up ” ) ;

128

RunIp ( r . Get ( i ) , S e c o n d s

(0.13) , ” link

set

sim1 up ” ) ;

129

char

route [ 6 0 ] ;

130

s p r i n t f ( r o u t e , ”−6 r o u t e add 2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : 1 : : / 6 4

131

RunIp ( r . Get ( i ) , S e c o n d s

(0.15) ,

132

RunIp ( r . Get ( i ) , S e c o n d s

( 0 . 1 5 ) , ” r o u t e show t a b l e

133

k e r n = r . Get ( i )−>GetObject<L i n u x S o c k e t F d F a c t o r y >() ;

134

S i m u l a t o r : : S c h e d u l e W i t h C o n t e x t ( r . Get ( i )−>GetId ( ) , S e c o n d s
֒→ L i n u x S o c k e t F d F a c t o r y : : S et ,

via

2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : 2 : : % d dev sim0 ” ,

all ”) ;

}

136

// For MN

137

RunIp (mn . Get ( 0 ) , S e c o n d s

(0.11) , ” link

set

l o up ” ) ;

138

RunIp (mn . Get ( 0 ) , S e c o n d s

(0.11) , ” link

set

sim0 up” ) ;

139

for
{

( int

141

for

142

{

( 0 . 1 ) , MakeEvent (&

kern , ” . n e t . i p v 6 . c o n f . a l l . f o r w a r d i n g ” , ” 1 ” ) ) ;

135

140

j =0; j <numR ; j ++)

( int

i =0; i <numN ; i ++)

143

RunIp ( cn . Get ( ( j ∗numN)+i ) , S e c o n d s

(0.11) , ” link

set

l o up ” ) ;

144

RunIp ( cn . Get ( ( j ∗numN)+i ) , S e c o n d s

(1.11) , ” link

set

sim0 up” ) ;

145

char

146

s p r i n t f ( r o u t e , ”−6 r o u t e add d e f a u l t

147

RunIp ( cn . Get ( ( j ∗numN)+i ) , S e c o n d s

148

c h a r IP [ 2 0 ] ;

route [ 6 0 ] ;
via

2001:9:9:%d : : 1

(1.11) ,

149

s p r i n t f ( IP , ” 2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : % d : : % d /64 ” , j +3 , i +2) ;

150

AddAddress ( cn . Get ( ( j ∗numN)+i ) , S e c o n d s

151
152

i +1) ;

route ) ;

dev sim0 ” ,

j +3) ;

route ) ;

( 0 . 1 2 ) , ” sim0 ” , IP ) ;

}
}

153

A p p l i c a t i o n C o n t a i n e r apps ;

154

QuaggaHelper quagga ;

155

Mip6dHelper mip6d ;

156

// UMIP c o n f i g u r a t i o n s

157

mip6d . EnableCN ( cn ) ;

158

mip6d . I n s t a l l

( cn ) ;

// UMIP

// CN
//CN

159

std : : s t r i n g

160

ha addr . r e p l a c e

ha addr = ha sim0 ;

161

mip6d . AddHomeAgentAddress (mn . Get ( 0 ) , I p v 6 A d d r e s s ( h a a d d r . c s t r

162

mip6d . AddHomeAddress (mn . Get ( 0 ) , I p v 6 A d d r e s s ( ” 2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : 0 : : 1 ” ) ,

163

mip6d . A d d E g r e s s I n t e r f a c e

164

mip6d . I n s t a l l

165

// R

166

quagga . EnableRadvd ( r . Get ( 0 ) , ” sim1 ” , ” 2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : 1 : : / 6 4 ” ) ;

167

quagga . EnableRadvd ( r . Get ( 1 ) , ” sim0 ” , ” 2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : 2 : : / 6 4 ” ) ;

( ha addr . f i n d

// We s h o u l d

set

t h e HA a d d r e s s

in

the

configurations

( ” / ” ) , 3 , ” \0 ” ) ;

(mn . Get ( 0 ) , ” sim0 ” ) ;

(mn) ;
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() ) ) ;
Ipv6Prefix

(64) ) ;

168

for

169

{

170

( int

i =0; i <numR ; i ++)

c h a r sim [ 7 ] ;

171

s p r i n t f ( sim , ” sim%d” ,

172

quagga . EnableRadvd ( r . Get ( 1 ) , sim , ” 2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : 2 : : / 6 4 ” ) ;

i +1) ;

173

}

174

quagga . EnableZebraDebug ( r ) ;

175

quagga . I n s t a l l

176

// MN:

177

for

178

{

( int

179

for

180

{

(r);

send ping

packets

to

a l l CNs .

Pings a r e needed to

j =0; j <numR ; j ++)

( int

i =0; i <numN ; i ++)

181

D ce Ap p li cati on H el pe r dce ;

182

dce . SetBinary ( ” ping6 ” ) ;

183

dce . S e t S t a c k S i z e

184

d c e . ResetArguments

185

dce . ResetEnvironment

186

d c e . AddArgument ( ”−c ” ) ;

187

d c e . AddArgument ( ” 1 ” ) ; // Only one p i n g ( apps s t o p s

188

c h a r IP [ 2 0 ] ;

( 1 << 1 6 ) ;
() ;
() ;

189

s p r i n t f ( IP , ” 2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : % d : : % d” , j +3 , i +2) ;

190

d c e . AddArgument ( IP ) ;

191

A p p l i c a t i o n C o n t a i n e r apps = d c e . I n s t a l l

192

float

193

( Seconds ( time ) ) ;

195

}

196

// i p e r f

197

int

Port = 5 0 0 0 1 ;

198

for

( int

199

{
for

201

{

client

j =0; j <numR ; j ++)

( int

i =0; i <numN ; i ++)

202

DceApplicationHelper

dceclient ;

203

ApplicationContainer

appsclient ;

204

dceclient . SetStackSize

( 1 << 2 0 ) ;
on e a c h CN

205

// Launch

206

d c e c l i e n t . SetBinary ( ” i p e r f ” ) ;

207

d c e c l i e n t . ResetArguments

208

d c e c l i e n t . ResetEnvironment

209

d c e c l i e n t . AddArgument ( ”−V” ) ;

210

d c e c l i e n t . AddArgument ( ”−c ” ) ;

211

d c e c l i e n t . AddArgument ( ” 2 0 0 1 : 9 : 9 : 0 : : 1 ” ) ;

iperf

client

() ;
() ;

212

d c e c l i e n t . AddArgument ( ”−t ” ) ;

213

d c e c l i e n t . AddArgument ( ” 100 ” ) ;

10 s e c o n d s )

(mn) ;

}

200

after

t i m e = 10.0+ f l o a t ( ( ( j ∗numN)+i ) / 1 0 0 . 0 0 ) ; // J u s t a

apps . S t a r t

194

s t a r t Route O p t i m i z a t i o n .

// d u r a t i o n

of

test

147

little

d e l a y between p i n g commands

214

d c e c l i e n t . AddArgument ( ”−p” ) ;

215

c h a r PORT [ 5 ] ;

216

s p r i n t f (PORT, ”%d” , P o r t ) ;

217

P o r t ++;

218

d c e c l i e n t . AddArgument (PORT) ;

219

d c e c l i e n t . AddArgument ( ”−u” ) ;

220

d c e c l i e n t . AddArgument ( ”−b” ) ;

221

d c e c l i e n t . AddArgument ( ” 1 . 1 7 6m” ) ; // 100 p a c k e t s

222

appsclient = dceclient . Install

223

float

224

appsclient . Start

225

1470∗8∗100

t i m e = 22.0+ f l o a t ( ( ( j ∗numN)+i ) / 1 0 0 . 0 0 ) ;
( Seconds ( time ) ) ;

}

226

}

227

// i p e r f

228

Port = 5 0 0 0 1 ;

229

for

230

{

Server

( int

i =0; i <(numR∗numN) ; i ++)// Open p o r t s

231

DceApplicationHelper

dceserver ;

232

ApplicationContainer

appsserver ;

233

dceserver . SetStackSize

234

// Launch

235

dceserver . SetBinary ( ” i p e r f ” ) ;

236

d c e s e r v e r . ResetArguments

237

d c e s e r v e r . ResetEnvironment

238

d c e s e r v e r . AddArgument ( ”−V” ) ;

239

d c e s e r v e r . AddArgument ( ”−s ” ) ;

240

d c e s e r v e r . AddArgument ( ”−p” ) ;

iperf

() ;
() ;

c h a r PORT [ 5 ] ;
s p r i n t f (PORT, ”%d” , P o r t ) ;

243

P o r t ++;

244

d c e s e r v e r . AddArgument (PORT) ;

245

d c e s e r v e r . AddArgument ( ”−u” ) ;

246

appsserver = dceserver . I n s t a l l
float

248

appsserver . Start

249

a l l CNs

( 1 << 2 0 ) ;

241

247

for

s e r v e r on t h e MN

242

(mn) ;

t i m e = 20.0+ f l o a t ( i / 1 0 0 . 0 0 ) ;
( Seconds ( time ) ) ;

}

250

// p o i n t T o P o i n t . EnablePcap ( ” t e s t ” , mn,

251

S i m u l a t o r : : Stop ( S e c o n d s

252

S i m u l a t o r : : Run ( ) ;

253

Simulator : : Destroy

254
255

p e r s e c o n d ( e a c h 1470B) .

( cn . Get ( ( j ∗numN)+i ) ) ;

return

0) ;

// E n a b l e Pcap T r a c i n g o n l y

(129.0) ) ;

() ;

0;

}

148

f o r MN ( f o r TCP t e s t )
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